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 1 Introduction
Traditionally, young innovative ﬁrms have diﬃculties in obtaining capital. Reasons are the
high risk, the severe asymmetric information issues as well as the various moral hazard
problems that come hand in hand with such an investment. As the venture capital industry
succeeded in developing several mechanisms to cope with the mentioned problems, it has
become essential for the ﬁnancing of these ﬁrms1. In this paper, we look at one major
mechanism: staging.
Staging implies that not all the capital necessary to ﬁnance the project is paid out up
front but in several tranches. The exact conditions for these tranches vary. To be more
speciﬁc, there exist two diﬀerent forms: round ﬁnancing and milestone ﬁnancing. Round
ﬁnancing means that every new tranche is negotiated separately when the venture needs
further funding; milestone ﬁnancing requires that exact contingencies that the ﬁrm has
to achieve to obtain new funds are ﬁxed in the initial contract. Therefore, the decision for
one speciﬁc mode of staging is also a decision for or against contract completeness which
then determines the impact of renegotiation on future ﬁnancing conditions.
Against this background, the aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we examine
the determinants of staging in general. Second, we analyze the contracting parties’ choice
of one speciﬁc form of staging. We show that the decision for staging per se is determined
by the degree of uncertainty and asymmetric information whereas the use of a speciﬁc
form of staging is determined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between
the contracting parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the
development process.
To our knowledge, there only exist three important empirical studies on staging. First,
Gompers (1995) [11] looks at the structure of staged investments. He focuses on the de-
terminants of funding size and funding duration for round ﬁnancing but refrains from
analyzing the determinants for one speciﬁc form of staging. The same is true for Ka-
plan and Str¨ omberg (2003) [15] and (2004) [16] who examine the determinants of the
strength of both round and milestone ﬁnancing separately. In this paper, we go beyond
the existing empirical research by empirically modelling the choice of a speciﬁc form of
staging. Thereby, we focus on the impact of renegotiation of future ﬁnancing conditions
on the initial contract design. We are not aware of other empirical papers testing this
issue. However, Guasch et al. (2003) [13] and Ricard (2005) [22] present studies that focus
on the decision for renegotiation given actual contracts. The former estimate a model of
renegotiation for South-American procurement contracts while the latter considers con-
tract renegotiation in the Spanish movie industry. Thus our approach is complementary
to theirs.
1For a more detailed introduction to venture capital, see for example Gompers and Lerner (1999) [12].
1Moreover, the majority of the growing empirical literature on venture capital, includ-
ing the three previously mentioned studies on staging, is based on US data. Important
exceptions are, for example, Kaplan et al. (2003) [17] whose study is based on a set of 23
countries, as well as Cumming (2002) [8] and Bottazzi et al. (2004) [4] for the European
market. The most important exhaustive study for the German market is the one of Bascha
and Walz (2002) [2] that is based on survey data and analyzes security choice.
Against this background, the paper attempts to further reduce the existing gap of
empirical research for venture capital industries outside the US by using a data set based
on the German market. More importantly, contrary to existing studies about the German
market, the underlying data set exhibits unique characteristics. First, the data set (a
proprietary one from KfW) constitutes a random sample of all VC projects supported
by KfW in Frankfurt, Germany. As KfW is involved in a substantial part of all German
venture capital investments, it is a representative sample of the German venture capital
industry. Second, it covers both boom and bust periods as the data range from 1991 until
2004. Finally, contrary to the majority of empirical studies, the data set is not based on
survey data but the information was directly gathered from the contracts. To be more
precise, it is based on all major documents concerning a speciﬁc deal, i.e. the business
plan, the balance sheet, the term sheet, the shareholder’s agreement as well as additional
agreements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical
literature; the third section describes the underlying data set and presents descriptive
statistics that characterize the venture capital industry in Germany. In the fourth section,
we present empirical results. Section ﬁve concludes.
2 What does theory tell us?
In this section, we summarize the theoretical literature related to staging proceeding in two
steps: while the diﬀerent forms of staging - milestone and round ﬁnancing - are analyzed
in subsection 2.2, in the next subsection, we discuss the determinants of the decision for
staging in general.
2.1 Why do we use staging?
Staging implies that some of the funds deemed necessary for the ﬁrm to complete its
project are withheld. This mechanism has three major implications.
First of all, as not all capital is provided up front, staging implicitly gives the investor
the right to decide about the continuation or liquidation of the ﬁrm. This exit option
for the investor saves resources because infeasible (negative NPV) projects are identiﬁed
2and liquidated early on (see Hellmann (1994) [14]). Obviously, this advantage is the more
pronounced the higher the existing ex ante uncertainty about the proﬁtability of the
project.
Second, in an asymmetric information context, staging can be interpreted as a signaling
mechanism. Staged high quality ﬁrms face a low risk of liquidation in comparison with low
quality ﬁrms whose liquidation risk is especially high. Thus an entrepreneur with private
information about his ﬁrm’s quality is able to use staging as a signal of ﬁrm quality.
This issue is modelled by Dessein (2004) [10]. He models how a transfer of control to
the investor serves as a signal of ﬁrm quality and congruence of objectives between the
investor and the entrepreneur. Moreover, he shows that investor control is increasing in
the ex ante information asymmetry and in the ex post uncertainty about the project.
One possibility of implementing investor control in this model is by short-term ﬁnancing.
However, short-term ﬁnancing can be interpreted as staging. Thus staging is the better,
the higher the degree of asymmetric information ex ante and the more diﬃcult future
monitoring ex post.
Third, staging can act as a commitment device for the entrepreneur not to renegotiate
the initial contract. This eﬀect does not depend on the liquidation risk related to staging
but rather on the fact that injecting less capital at the beginning of the relationship implies
less sunk capital and consequently limited renegotiation possibilities for the entrepreneur.
Neher (1999) [18] precisely models this mechanism. He shows that the entrepreneur cannot
credibly commit to work and not to renegotiate if the venture has no collateral and the
only asset is the entrepreneur’s human capital itself. Furthermore, he points out that the
hold-up problem can be solved by staging as the stepwise provision of capital coincides
with a gradual embodiment of the entrepreneur’s human capital in the ﬁrm. Thus staging
should be the more advantageous, the more crucial the entrepreneur’s human capital for
the success of the project and the less tangible the assets.
We summarize these arguments in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The higher the uncertainty, the higher the degree of asymmetric infor-
mation, the more diﬃcult future monitoring, the more crucial the entrepreneur’s human
capital and the less tangible the ﬁrm’s assets, the more probable is staging.
Staging, of course, has also serious shortcomings. First of all, staging may cause de-
lays as entrepreneurs have to commit time to the negotiation process. This lag caused in
implementing the project can induce additional costs such as retardation in the develop-
ment process or in market entry, lost economies of scale or cost overruns. Certainly, these
additional costs have to be outweighed by the beneﬁts of staging. We think, however,
that these costs can be disregarded as they can be minimized by optimally structuring
the negotiation process.
3Second, Cornelli and Yosha (2003) [7] show that the entrepreneur may react to the
prospect of early liquidation with an attempt to manipulate available information. This
phenomenon, called window dressing, reduces the positive eﬀects of staging and tends to
be the more probable the softer the information available. This is exactly the case for
ﬁrms for which the beneﬁts of staging are the highest. Thus we cannot control for the
underlying countervailing eﬀects but only for the net eﬀect of staging. This means that
throughout all our tests concerning hypothesis 1, we will have to take into account that
we only measure the net impact of staging.
Finally, staging also changes the entrepreneur’s incentives. This impact is ambiguous:
on the one hand, the liquidation risk increases the entrepreneur’s incentives and, in turn,
the project’s overall probability of success. Wang and Zhou (2002) [23], for example,
show that the termination threat induces the entrepreneur to work harder in order to
ensure further ﬁnancing by the investor. Therefore, in their model, the eﬀort level of the
entrepreneur is always higher under staged ﬁnancing. On the other hand, staging induces
opportunistic behavior by the investor. This opportunistic behavior, in turn, reduces the
entrepreneur’s ex ante incentives. The negative incentive eﬀect of staging must therefore be
traded oﬀ against the above mentioned positive incentive eﬀect. This trade-oﬀ is analyzed
by Rajan (1992) [20], for example, who compares arm’s length ﬁnancing (i.e. upfront
ﬁnancing) and insider ﬁnancing (i.e. staging). However, the extent of the negative eﬀect
crucially depends on the form of staging. Aghion et al. (1994) [1] point out that the under-
investment problem normally related to renegotiation (and therefore to staging) can be
completely overcome by an adequate design of the renegotiation process2. If this is the
case, the net incentive eﬀect can never be negative and its size depends upon the form
of staging. Then incentive eﬀects should not have an inﬂuence on the decision of staging
per se but rather on the choice of a speciﬁc form of staging as we will show in the next
subsection.
2.2 When do we observe what form of staging?
In the last section, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of staging per se.
However, some eﬀects of staging, and among these especially the incentive eﬀect for the
entrepreneur, crucially depend on the form of staging which is chosen.
To be more precise, as shown above, there exist two diﬀerent forms of staging, namely
round ﬁnancing and milestone ﬁnancing. With round ﬁnancing, every new tranche is
2They show that only two conditions must be fulﬁlled in order to guarantee an eﬃcient outcome: ﬁrst,
the initial contract must specify a default option in case renegotiation fails and second, it must assign all
the bargaining power to one party. The default option is determined by the initial contract, especially by
the covenants which attribute speciﬁc rights to the investor in certain circumstances.
4negotiated separately when the venture needs further funding3. With milestone ﬁnancing,
the initial contract determines exact contingencies that the ﬁrm has to achieve to obtain
new funds. Provided that the milestones are reached, the VC has the contractual obligation
to release the funds to the ﬁrm4. Examples for such contingencies are the amount of
revenues realized, the number of patents ﬁled or the development of prototypes. Thus in
this section, we analyze the disadvantages and advantages of these two forms in order to
identify the determinants of a particular choice.
Firstly, milestone and round ﬁnancing diﬀer with respect to the degree of ex post
ﬂexibility and ex ante ineﬃciency. Whereas round ﬁnancing oﬀers more ex post ﬂexibility,
one obvious advantage of milestone ﬁnancing is that it excludes renegotiation. Therefore,
it prevents hold-up by the investor what eliminates the ex ante ineﬃciency caused thereby.
This solution mechanism is modelled by N¨ oldecke and Schmidt (1995) [19], for example.
In their model, the under-investment problem is overcome if the parties write a simple
option contract that is very closely related to milestone ﬁnancing: the entrepreneur has
the right but not the obligation to exert certain eﬀort levels and reach the speciﬁed
milestones5. If the milestones are reached, the investor must pay out the next tranche of
capital as determined in the initial contract. If the milestones are not reached, the default
point is speciﬁed by the action chosen by the entrepreneur, i.e. the result achieved. If the
diﬀerence between the two cases is larger than the entrepreneur’s eﬀort costs, high eﬀort
becomes worthwhile. So milestone ﬁnancing is the more proﬁtable, the more pronounced
the negative incentive eﬀect due to possible hold-up by the investor.
In a similar way, Bigus (2002) [3] points out that the hold-up problem is the less
pronounced, the smaller the loss of the entrepreneur when the relationship ends and
a new investor must be found6. This means that the advantage of milestone ﬁnancing
increases with a decline in the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing option.
Secondly, Cuny and Talmor (2004) [9] raise another advantage of milestone ﬁnancing,
namely its greater ex ante ﬂexibility: With milestone ﬁnancing, one contract covers multi-
ple states of the world simultaneously and thus claims need not to be priced fairly ex post
but only ex ante, i.e. before knowing the outcome. This higher ﬂexibility is especially valu-
able if there exists a pronounced heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting parties
or if particular states require diﬀerent incentive mechanisms.
3Thus no further funding is also an option.
4However, if any of the predetermined conditions are not met, no further funding will take place unless
both parties negotiate new terms.
5Note that the exercise of any standard option contract is followed by a guaranteed delivery, while
in our case some residual uncertainty is required because otherwise the moral hazard problem becomes
irrelevant.
6He interprets his result by stating that the loss can be reduced by reenforcing patent protection as
to avoid idea stealing by the investor. As in our data set, regulations are given, we focus only on the
ﬁnancing options.
5Thirdly, Cuny and Talmor (2004) [9] also mention another possible disadvantage of
milestone ﬁnancing. Milestone ﬁnancing promises the whole investment (contingent on
milestones) ex ante whereas with round ﬁnancing, there exists only a commitment to
ﬁnance the current investment round. This means that the investor’s claim should be
considerably larger under milestone than under round ﬁnancing. If we assume pure eq-
uity ﬁnancing, this implies a larger equity stake given to the investor and consequently,
a smaller equity stake retained by the entrepreneur: the entrepreneur’s incentives are re-
duced. Thus the larger the total investment, the larger the negative incentive eﬀect due
to milestone ﬁnancing. However, this is only valid with pure equity ﬁnancing when the
VC’s equity stake is ﬁxed initially and any additional capital is paid into the ﬁrm’s cap-
ital reserves. Albeit this construct is found in practice, other constructs that avoid this
problem are also frequently found. Thus the magnitude of this issue is not quite clear.
A further obvious, but extremely important caveat with respect to the choice of the
diﬀerent staging forms is the feasibility aspect: round ﬁnancing and milestone ﬁnancing
must be implementable. As concerns round ﬁnancing, it may cause prohibitively high
contracting costs for very short time intervals creating a lower limit for the minimum
duration of each round. The availability and enforceability of adequate milestone may be
even more crucial. Even though this question has been largely ignored in the mentioned
theoretical discussion, it is of extremely high empirical relevance. There are only a few
studies that explicitly consider the nature of signals available and their relation to con-
tracts. Repullo and Suarez (2004) [21], for example, look at the optimal capital structure
with staging and the inﬂuence of signal availability on contract design7. To sum up these
arguments, we can state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Given feasibility of both staging forms, round ﬁnancing compared to mile-
stone ﬁnancing should be the more probable, the better the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing
option, the less pronounced the heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting parties and
the higher the total investment amount.
3 The Data Set
3.1 Sample and Sample Selection Issues
Our analysis uses a proprietary, hand-collected data set from KfW based on contracts
between VCs and their portfolio ﬁrms. KfW has a unique position in Germany’s venture
capital market: being Germany’s largest promotional bank, it supports innovative ﬁrms
by promoting the investment of the VCs. Although, as concerns our sample, KfW never
directly invests in any of the portfolio ﬁrms, it becomes indirectly involved in the venture
7See section 4.2 and subsection 4.3.1 for details.
6capital deals in Germany. In order to obtain support from KfW, VCs had to apply by
submitting the key details of their relationship with the portfolio ﬁrm, most notably,
the term sheets, the business plans and the shareholder’s agreements. By providing us
with access to these documents, KfW gave us the unique opportunity to collect detailed
information on the relationship between the VC and its portfolio ﬁrm based on actual
contract data.
In order to reduce the very time-intensive task of collecting detailed information from
the numerous documents to a manageable size, we drew a random sample of 300 portfolio
ﬁrms8. We categorized each portfolio company into one of three classes with respect to
their investment date (before 1998, between 1998 and 2000, and after 2000) and eight
classes with respect to the program or program combination through which their VC
investor was supported by KfW. This categorization was undertaken with the objective
to achieve a balanced representation of the population. Table 1 gives an overview about
our sample and the support programs considered. Unfortunately, the data for 10 portfolio
companies could not be evaluated. Therefore, our random sample ﬁnally consists of 290
portfolio companies that were ﬁnanced in 464 investment rounds between 1991 and 2004.
We are conﬁdent that we do not have any major bias in the selection of our sample
for two reasons. Firstly, as we were responsible for the sample selection process ourselves,
we ensured that no selection bias occurred via the provider of all our documents (KfW)
by drawing a random sample of all VC ﬁnanced portfolio companies supported by KfW.
Secondly, KfW supported a large proportion of the population of all investments realized
by the German venture capital industry in the time period under consideration9. This
means that we have a representative sample of the German VC industry. One obvious
selection bias which we were not able to circumvent is the fact that we are concentrating
on one particular geographic region (Germany) and the associated venture capital market.
To a lesser degree this is true for the time period. We take all this into consideration by
interpreting our data sample as the description of a situation of a young and evolving
venture capital market.
As concerns the process of data collection, for each investment round, we evaluated
the company’s balance sheet data and its business plan to get information with respect
to the market position of the company and details about the ﬁnanced project. Moreover,
we took from the term sheet and the shareholder’s agreement detailed information about
the security design, the timing, conditions and syndication of the investment, control
and information rights of the venture capitalists and exit covenants. We translated this
8We draw this sample out of the population of all portfolio ﬁrms that were ﬁnanced by venture
capitalists which, in turn, were supported by KfW via one of the programmes mentioned in table 1.
9According to the German Venture Capital Association ([5] and [6]), there were 11854 seed, start-up
and expansion deals by its members in the relevant time period; KfW supported almost 7100 deals of
potential members. This implies a market coverage of approximately 60%.
7information into quantiﬁable variables. Finally, we complemented the data set with in-
formation about the venture capitalist supported by KfW. Overall, we gained a detailed
picture of the control and information rights embedded in these contracts as well as of
the characteristics of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm, the founder(s) and the VCs involved.
As usual in this type of studies, we were confronted with the problem that not al-
ways all data were available. Thus the number of observations may vary depending on
the variable studied. Typically, the amount invested and valuations were the most reli-
able variables whereas information on staging or investment memoranda were sometimes
missing. Still, we do not see a systematic selection bias problem because there are several
reasons for missing data. On the one hand, data may be missing for very young ﬁrms but,
on the other hand, we often had also the most exhaustive term sheets for these ﬁrms.
3.2 Variable Descriptions
In what follows, we describe the data set in more detail and introduce the variables
necessary for our regressions. Please note that all balance sheet data as well as exogenous
factors such as the state of product development or the degree of asymmetric information
is information that is known to the VC and the entrepreneur before they sign the contract.
3.2.1 Firm characteristics
We have information about the project and the respective portfolio company. The vari-
able AGE represents the age of the ﬁrm when the corresponding ﬁnancing round is closed.
Moreover, we observe the ﬁrm’s industry: LIFE SCIENCES, INTERNET, IT/TELECOM,
TRADITIONAL HIGH-TECH and OTHER INDUSTRIES are all dummy variables that in-
dicate the project’s industry. GROWTH INDUSTRIES is a dummy variable that indicates
whether the ﬁrm is active in an industry with high growth potential, that is whether it
corresponds to one of the three ﬁrst mentioned industries or not.
Furthermore, we observe the ﬁrm’s development stage in each ﬁnancing round. First,
we have information about the ﬁrm’s development stage as deﬁned by the German Ven-
ture Capital Association. We distinguish seed and start-up ﬁrms on the one hand, and
expansion and later stage ﬁrms on the other hand: the dummy EARLY STAGE indicates
whether the ﬁrm belongs to the ﬁrst group or not. Second, we have balance sheet infor-
mation from the year preceding the closing date of the corresponding ﬁnancing round. We
know whether the ﬁrm has any revenues (if this is the case, the dummy REVENUES takes
value one) and we observe the ﬁxed asset ratio (FAR) that indicates the ratio of ﬁxed
assets to balance sheet total10. Third, we have information about the ﬁrm’s achievements.
10As we have many missing values in our sample, we adopt the following procedure. For all ﬁrms in a
ﬁrst ﬁnancing round, with an age of less than one year and an investment phase of seed or early, we set
8We know whether the ﬁrm has ﬁnished its product tests; whether it already has a ﬁnished
product; whether the ﬁrm holds any patents or if it even has reference customers. We
deﬁne a dummy named PATENTS taking value one if the ﬁrm holds any patents or its
patents are pending when the ﬁnancing round was closed. In addition, we construct two
types of indicator variables that we deem necessary to test our hypotheses. First, we cre-
ate a proxy for the degree of asymmetric information between both parties named AI. We
think that the degree of asymmetric information heavily depends upon the amount of ver-
iﬁable information that is available for the project. Thus we create a categorical variable
by summing up four dummy variables which describe, in our opinion, essential steps in re-
ducing information asymmetry: the dummy AUDITED BALANCE SHEET that indicates
whether the balance sheet has been audited or not, the dummy FINISHED PRODUCT
which signals the existence of a product, the dummy REFERENCE CUSTOMERS that
indicates the existence of any reference customers and ﬁnally, the dummy BREAK EVEN
that takes value one if the ﬁrm has reached its break-even point. While we could have
included more factors in this deﬁnition, one problem we have is that we loose observa-
tions due to missing data. We thus strive for an optimal balance between measuring the
degree of asymmetric information and data availability. Additionally, we deﬁne a variable
which measures the relative degree of asymmetric information named RAI. This variable
is aimed at correcting for the developmental aspect inherent in the AI variable. It is de-
ﬁned as the ratio of the degree of asymmetric information of the respective ﬁrm relative
to the average degree of asymmetric information of all ﬁrms in the respective development
stages (early stage, expansion, later stage). Second, we construct two measures that cap-
ture the current position of the ﬁrm in its development process: MARKET ENTRY takes
value one if the ﬁrm has both a ﬁnished product and revenues. This proxy indicates that
the introduction of the product in the market has successfully taken place. The dummy
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT takes value one if the product development process is just
starting, i.e. if there does not exist a ﬁnished product, there do not exist any reference
customers and product tests have not been successfully completed yet.
Finally, we observe whether the ﬁrm already received ﬁnancing from banks or other
VCs prior to the observed investment round. More concretely, we deﬁne a dummy OUT-
SIDE FINANCE that takes value one if the portfolio company has received bank, angel
or other VC ﬁnance before the ﬁrst round of VC ﬁnancing we are looking at or if VC
ﬁnancing takes (or has taken place before) via a syndicate of diﬀerent VCs. We think that
both facts weaken the (lead) VC’s informational advantage over other investors and thus
ameliorate the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing option.
the ﬁxed asset ratio to zero. If we lack information for higher rounds, we use the same ratio as in the
round before. If this ratio is not available, we code both as missing values. Additionally, we do not resort
to the preceding round in the case of second rounds where we coded the ﬁrst round data to be zero.
93.2.2 VC, entrepreneur and investment characteristics
Second, we have information about the VC, the entrepreneur and the investment char-
acteristics. We classify each VC according to his type into three categories named IN-
DEPENDENT VC, PUBLIC VC and OTHER VC. The latter category includes both bank-
dependent and corporate VCs11.
Moreover, we have information about the entrepreneurs running the portfolio ﬁrm. We
know if any of the founders has a PhD or higher degree of education (then, the dummy
variable RESEARCH DEGREE takes value one), we observe whether any of the founders
has a background in engineering or natural sciences (in this case, the dummy variable
SCIENCE BACKGROUND takes value one) and we know whether we face a repeat en-
trepreneur, i.e. someone who has already run a ﬁrm (this is captured by the dummy vari-
able REPEAT ENTREPRENEUR). In order to account for the value of the entrepreneur’s
human capital within the ﬁrm, we construct the variable E EXPERT. As we know that the
entrepreneur’s role is crucial for the technological development of the product, we take
into account both the qualiﬁcation of the entrepreneur and the need of expertise by the
ﬁrm when constructing the variable. More concretely, the variable takes value one if the
ﬁrm belongs to a high-tech industry, the ﬁrm’s product has not ﬁnished any tests (i.e.
the ﬁrm strongly needs the entrepreneur’s contribution) and if the entrepreneur holds a
research degree (i.e. the entrepreneur is highly qualiﬁed).
Finally, we have information about the investment itself. We observe the year when
the ﬁnancing round is closed and deﬁne three time dummies. PERIOD 1 takes value one
if the ﬁnancing round is closed during the early period of relatively low venture capital
activity, namely before 1998, PERIOD 2 if it is closed during the boom, i.e. between
1998 and 2000 and PERIOD 3 if it is closed after 2000 - a period of relative decline and
reorganization of the venture capital industry. In addition, we observe the total amount
invested, the ﬁnancing instrument used and the timing of the investment. In order to
control for the total amount of capital necessary to ﬁnance the project, we construct a
further proxy variable. We assume that each ﬁrm’s balance sheet has to reach a certain
minimum threshold before the ﬁrm can be taken public. This size is the average balance
sheet of all ﬁrms in Germany’s ”Neuer Markt” prior to their IPO in the ﬁve mentioned
industries12. The variable EBS (expected balance sheet) is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the average balance sheet of the public ﬁrms in the respective industry and the
current balance sheet of the ﬁrm we are studying and is again normalized by the average
balance sheet13.
11We also include the business angels in our sample in this category.
12We thank Stefanie Franzke for giving us access to her data on IPOs on the ”Neuer Markt”.
13For around 20 ﬁrms we observe this value to be negative. Our theory says nothing about this type
of ﬁrms. Therefore, we coded them as missing values in our regressions.
103.2.3 Staging: Deﬁnition and Measurement
As the aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of staging and its diﬀerent forms,
it is important to exploit all the available information related to staging. Therefore, in
a ﬁrst step, we deﬁne a dummy variable, named STAGING, that takes value one if the
project is ﬁnanced in several steps and zero otherwise. This means that STAGING takes
value one whenever one of the diﬀerent staging forms can be observed. These are captured
by two dummy variables: ROUND takes value one if staging is made in several independent
rounds and MILESTONE if future capital is contingent on speciﬁc known milestones.
To be more precise, the variable MILESTONE takes value one if at least 20% of the in-
vestment is dependent on the achievement of predeﬁned milestones. The variable ROUND
takes value one whenever we observe a further ﬁnancing round. Additionally, it takes
value one when we know that the current round does not ﬁnance the project until its
break-even. The latter information is taken from the VC’s investment memoranda. This
construction has two important implications. First, we even have information for the most
recently ﬁnanced projects what allows us to circumvent two major econometric problems:
truncation and autocorrelation between the ﬁnancing rounds. Second, the probability of
round ﬁnancing may be overestimated (and therefore, the probability of staging) as the
above deﬁnition also includes rounds where staging was not expected in the beginning but
occurred “by accident”. The problem we faced was that it is quite diﬃcult to distinguish
between the fact that further ﬁnancing rounds were really unexpected or were just not
mentioned in the original contract.
We also deﬁne three subcategories: PURE MILESTONES, PURE ROUNDS and MIXES.
PURE MILESTONES takes value one if milestone ﬁnancing occurs and we know that no
round ﬁnancing takes place. Analogously, we deﬁne PURE ROUNDS. MIXES takes value
one if we know that milestone and round ﬁnancing are used simultaneously. Finally,
we consider four categories of milestones: ﬁnancial milestones, product milestones, ﬁrm
speciﬁc (other) milestones and diﬀerent mixes of these types of milestones.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In what follows, we want to give a more detailed overview about the sample. Therefore, in
a ﬁrst step, we present some basic descriptive statistics. The average amount invested per
ﬁnancing round is about 5.4 million euros and the portfolio companies are in average 5.08
years old when they receive VC ﬁnancing for the ﬁrst time. The medians are considerably
smaller (1.3 million euros and 2 years), an indication for outliers. At this point, one can
already infer that the percentage of early stage ﬁnancing is quite high in our sample.
Indeed, 11.3% of the ﬁnancing rounds correspond to seed ﬁnancing and 61.5% to start-up
ﬁnancing whereas only 20.7% of the ﬁnancing rounds are related to expansion and 6.6%
11to later stage ﬁrms14. The portfolio companies are active in a broad range of industries:
20.7% in the ﬁeld of life sciences, 36% in the sector of IT, telecommunications and software
development, 9.7% belong to the internet sector, 19.6% are active in traditional high-tech
industries and 14% could not be classiﬁed in neither of these sectors but are active in
rather less R&D intensive branches.
Second, we want to characterize the diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial instruments used (see
table 2). As a broad range of diﬀerent combinations of ﬁnancial instruments achieves the
same allocation of cash-ﬂow and control rights, it is important to analyze these instruments
properly. Therefore, we classify each ﬁnancial instrument used in a single ﬁnancing round
along ﬁve characteristics: upside cash ﬂow rights, downside protection, change of control,
cash ﬂow rights at exit and voting rights. This classiﬁcation procedure allows a better
interpretation of the securities used and guarantees better comparability. In a second
step, we distinguish four main categories (pure equity, pure debt15, debt-equity mixes
and convertibles) and nine subcategories. Thereby, the more detailed classiﬁcation takes
into account the existence of liquidation preferences or the extent of the debt component
in debt-equity mixes. We see that whereas debt and diﬀerent types of equity play an
important role (23 % and 29% respectively), debt-equity mixes are the most frequently
used type and occur in 38% of all ﬁnancing rounds. Only 8% of all ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by
convertible instruments.
Last but not least, table 3 describes the observed staging behavior in our sample.
Staging is used in 70% of the analyzed observations; pure rounds are the most frequently
used form (59%), followed by mixes (24%) and pure milestones (17%). There also seem to
be diﬀerences in the staging behavior across time and VC types. As shown in table 3, there
is a slight decline in the use of staging during the boom period - this may be attributed to
the reduced bargaining power of the VCs due to the high amounts of capital chasing few
deals in that time period - and an increase in period 3 slightly beyond the level of period 1.
Interestingly, when looking at the diﬀerent staging forms, we recognize more pronounced
changes. While in period 1 only 7% of staging is in the form of pure milestones, 7% is
in the form of mixes and 86% is in the form of pure rounds, the composition changes
dramatically in the third period: staging in the form of pure milestones increases up to
24%, staging in the form of mixes increases to 29% and staging in the form of pure rounds
decreases to 47%. As concerns the behavior of the diﬀerent VC types, we see that VC
types diﬀer in both the implementation of staging per se and the use of the diﬀerent forms
of staging. On the one hand, independent VCs use staging more often than other VC types
which in turn use staging more often than public VCs. On the other hand, independent
14These percentages refer to the ﬁnancing rounds for which we have available data for the respective
criterion.
15Debt is actually subordinated debt, thus it is only senior to the equity in the ﬁrm.
12VCs use rounds in more than half of all staged ﬁrms, but use relatively more mixes than
pure milestones; public VCs use rounds in more than half of all staged ﬁrms, but they
use relatively more pure milestones than mixes; and ﬁnally, other VC types use rounds in
77% of all staged ﬁrms and, similarly to public VCs, they use more pure milestones than
mixes.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The determinants of staging
We begin by evaluating hypothesis 1 that refers to the determinants of the staging decision.
In a ﬁrst step, we discuss the instrumentalization of this hypothesis before presenting the
descriptive statistics and the results of the univariate probit models. We conclude by
discussing the robustness of our results and their implications.
4.1.1 Instrumentalization of the hypothesis
Hypothesis 1 can be divided into two parts. The ﬁrst part states that the higher the
uncertainty, the higher the degree of asymmetric information and the more diﬃcult future
monitoring, the more probable is staging. The second part refers to the positive causal
relationship between the importance of the entrepreneur’s human capital and the staging
decision.
Therefore, our empirical strategy can be based on the following model:
Stagingi = fi(Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information, Human Capital, Controls) + i,
where
Stagingi =
(
1 if ﬁrm i is staged
0 if ﬁrm i is not staged
While ﬁnding adequate controls is relatively straightforward, diﬀerentiating between un-
certainty, asymmetric information and ﬁrm development in general poses a relatively large
challenge. Several potential indicator variables capture diﬀerent aspects of uncertainty and
asymmetric information like the ﬁrm’s age, the early stage dummy, the revenue dummy or
the AI variable16. However, none of these variables captures all diﬀerent facets of uncer-
tainty and asymmetric information and all of them include a “developmental aspect”. This
means that all indicator variables compare the ﬁrms along their development path but not
from a cross-sectional perspective. Unfortunately, such a cross-sectional view cannot be
16Note that these variables are indeed apt to control for the mentioned aspects because further char-
acteristics of older ﬁrms which are crucial in other contexts - like the availability of internal funds - are
irrelevant for the large majority of ﬁrms in our sample.
13implemented for the majority of these variables17. We try to cope with this limitation for
the AI variable by using the RAI variable instead. However, this variable must be handled
with precaution as some of its components are fundamentally linked to the development
stage of the ﬁrm. This means that the diﬀerences between the ﬁrms of one comparison
group (e.g. all early stage ﬁrms) are quite small resulting in a relatively low information
content of the variable.
Thus we face a set of possible proxy variables that are quite heterogeneous in the
economic eﬀects they capture but are certainly not mutually exclusive as they are partial
substitutes for each other. This view is also reconﬁrmed by the correlations of these vari-
ables (see table 5). As we face the econometric problem that we cannot include all proxies
simultaneously into the regression, we separately run the same standard speciﬁcation for
each proxy variable to ensure the robustness of our ﬁndings.
4.1.2 Descriptive results
The descriptive results are shown in table 4. As we can see, the descriptive statistics
broadly conﬁrm the ﬁrst part of hypothesis 1: staged ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly younger, have
lower revenues, are more probable to be early-stage ﬁrms and exhibit a higher degree of
asymmetric information. In fact, all four components of AI ( AUDITED BALANCE SHEET,
FINISHED PRODUCT, REFERENCE CUSTOMERS, BREAK EVEN) signiﬁcantly diﬀer
between staged and non-staged ﬁrms. Interestingly, the means of the RAI variable do not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer between staged and non-staged ﬁrms. This implies that developmental
aspects seem to play a crucial role. Though, given the above discussed limitations of our
RAI variable, this result does not mean that “pure” asymmetric information problems are
irrelevant.
The second part of hypothesis 1 is only partly conﬁrmed. Table 4 shows that neither
the ﬁxed asset ratio nor the majority of the human capital indicator variables signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀer between staged and non staged ﬁrms. Only the research degree dummy is
signiﬁcantly higher for staged ﬁrms.
Finally, there are several control variables which diﬀer signiﬁcantly. There are sig-
niﬁcantly more life-science and internet ﬁrms and signiﬁcantly less traditional high-tech
ﬁrms and ﬁrms of other industries among the staged ﬁrms. This may be explained by the
fact that the former industries are related to a higher degree of uncertainty or to the fact
that they are more research-intensive and that therefore the entrepreneur’s human capital
is more important. Moreover, there exist signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to the time
periods and the VC types.
17Because the developmental aspect is completely inherent to these variables.
144.1.3 Regression results
In this subsection, we present the results for hypothesis 1 based on univariate probit
regressions with error terms clustered at the ﬁrm level. The results corresponding to the
ﬁrst part of hypothesis 1 can be found in table 6. We ﬁnd broad support for this ﬁrst
part, namely the impact of uncertainty and asymmetric information. More speciﬁcally,
as outlined in subsection 1, we successively include all our diﬀerent proxy variables and
get the following results: AGE is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, showing that
the older the ﬁrm, the less probable becomes staging; EARLY STAGE is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level indicating that the probability for staging is 19% higher for
early stage ﬁrms; and ﬁnally, REVENUES is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
This means that the probability for staging is smaller for ﬁrms with revenues. In order
emphasize the asymmetric information aspect, we use the categorical variable AI. The
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level: the higher the degree of asymmetric information
the more probable becomes staging. Using the components of AI on an individual basis
yields further insights: in fact, the result seems to be driven by only one component of
AI, namely BREAK EVEN which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This already points out
that developmental aspects seem to play a predominant role. In order to blind out this
aspect and focus on “pure” asymmetric information, we subsequently include RAI in our
regression: the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant, however. We also get an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
for the expected sum of funding still necessary to bring the ﬁrm public (EBS)18.
It is also interesting to have a look at the control variables. Surprisingly, both the
control variables for the diﬀerent VC types and for the time periods are insigniﬁcant. The
picture is diﬀerent for the industry proxies though: LIFE SCIENCES, IT/TELECOM and
INTERNET are positive and broadly signiﬁcant. This can be explained by the fact that
ﬁrms in these industries have a higher growth potential, a higher degree of uncertainty
and a higher need for the entrepreneur’s contribution to the ﬁrm.
To seize the idea of the entrepreneur’s importance to the ﬁrm explicitly, we run several
additional regressions (see table 7). In a ﬁrst step, we include E EXPERT (variant a)
and, in a second step, the three diﬀerent dummy variables concerning the entrepreneur’s
human capital (variant b): REPEAT ENTREPRENEUR, SCIENCE BACKGROUND and
RESEARCH DEGREE. We run each variant for three diﬀerent speciﬁcations. First of all,
we include the ﬁxed asset ratio in order to test our hypothesis. Whereas the ﬁxed asset
ratio is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst variant, it is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the second
one. This result is not robust to the inclusion of AGE, for example. We then run the
18Interestingly, the coeﬃcient turns out to be highly signiﬁcant when coding the negative values as zeros.
The same is true for the means which diﬀer at the 5% signiﬁcance level. The result should be handled with
precaution, however, as these “unclassiﬁable” observations may be the driving force. Therefore, further
research is necessary at this point.
15regression with two of our proxy variables (AGE, EARLY STAGE)19. It turns out that
while our proxy variables continue to be highly signiﬁcant, neither E EXPERT nor the
individual human capital variables are signiﬁcant.
To conclude, we can say that the regression results are in line with the descriptive
statistics. They conﬁrm the ﬁrst part of hypothesis 1 that states that the higher the
uncertainty, the higher the degree of asymmetric information and the more diﬃcult future
monitoring, the more probable is staging. Just as in the t-tests, all our proxies are highly
signiﬁcant in each speciﬁcation of our regressions. Note, however, that our variables are not
able to attribute the decision for staging to “pure” asymmetric information aspects only as
developmental aspects seem to matter, too. The importance of the entrepreneur’s human
capital, on the contrary, is partly conﬁrmed by RESEARCH DEGREE in our descriptive
statistics, but none of the human capital variables is signiﬁcant in the regressions. The
same is true for the ﬁxed asset ratio. Thus the second part of hypothesis 1 that states
that staging should be the more probable, the more important the entrepreneur’s human
capital and the less tangible the assets is not conﬁrmed by our data. This result as
well as the result concerning the asymmetric information aspect should be handled with
precaution, however, due to the high amount of missing values as well as the limitations
of our indicator variables.
4.1.4 Discussion
Apart from staging, there exist further potential contracting elements with a similar
impact. Especially debt grants the VC an exit option or can be used by the entrepreneur as
a signaling device just as staging. Even though we focus our analysis on the determinants
of the decision for staging and not on substitutabilities and complementarities between
diﬀerent instruments, it is important to check that our results are not driven by the
underlying relationship between staging and debt.
However, we cannot directly include a debt variable in the above regressions because
debt would be an endogenous variable. It is a contractual element just like staging and thus
its use is determined simultaneously to staging. In order to cope with this disadvantage and
at the same time do justice to possible substitutability eﬀects, we run robustness checks for
our previous results by splitting our sample in one part that includes all observations that
have a strong debt component and a second part with all observations that do not have
a strong debt component. Strong debt component means pure debt, nonstandard debt or
convertibles of the subcategories “US style” or “mixes” (see table 2). For these securities,
the dummy DEBT COMPONENT takes value one. We ﬁnd that the determinants for the
19Note that AI and RAI as well as REVENUES are highly correlated with the human capital variables
so that we cannot include them in our regressions.
16staging decision are broadly conﬁrmed for each of the two subsamples20.
The major diﬀerences are the following. As concerns the descriptive statistics, the
time and industry eﬀects which we ﬁnd for the complete sample, seem to arise almost
exclusively from the observations with a strong debt component. The same is true for AU-
DITED BALANCE SHEET. On the other hand, the signiﬁcant diﬀerence of RESEARCH
DEGREE can only be conﬁrmed for the observations without a strong debt component.
In addition, the ﬁxed asset ratio turns out to be important for the subsample of obser-
vations with a strong debt component although it is neither signiﬁcant in the subsample
of observations without a strong debt component nor in the complete sample. This result
is also conﬁrmed in the regressions. Whereas all our proxy variables signiﬁcantly diﬀer in
the descriptive statistics, in the regressions, this is not the case anymore: whereas EARLY
STAGE continues to be highly signiﬁcant in both subsamples, AGE looses its signiﬁcance
for the subsample of observations with a strong debt component (the sign continues to be
correct). The reverse is true for BREAK EVEN. AI looses its signiﬁcance in both subsam-
ples but the sign continues to be negative. With respect to the human capital variables, we
do not get any robust results in any of the two subsamples. The regression results must,
however, be handled with precaution due to the limited number of observations. To sum
up, we get evidence that the determinants of staging do not change fundamentally when
splitting our sample in two subsamples according to the use of a strong debt component
or not.
In addition, it is interesting to compare our results on staging to the results found in the
papers based on US data. As mentioned above, Gompers (1995) [11] as well as Kaplan
and Str¨ omberg (2003) and (2004) [15], [16] consider staging in their studies. Gompers
shows that the younger the ﬁrms, the stronger is the staging eﬀect, i.e. fewer capital is
released to the venture and funding duration is shorter. This is broadly in line with our
ﬁndings: staging is more probable for younger ﬁrms. Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003) [15]
ﬁnd that round duration is longer for repeat entrepreneurs, while Kaplan and Str¨ omberg
(2004) [16] show that round duration increases in the degree of external risk, while the
amount of funding that is contingent increases with internal risks. Both ﬁndings are again
broadly in line with our ﬁndings: staging is more probable for ﬁrms with higher risks.
To conclude this subsection, the results are quite robust and in line with the existing
empirical research: we ﬁnd that the decision for staging is determined by the degree of
uncertainty and asymmetric information the investor is confronted with. Throughout all
our regressions, the proxy variables AGE, EARLY STAGE, REVENUES and AI are highly
signiﬁcant. The relative degree of asymmetric information is never signiﬁcant, however.
The same is true for the expected investment amount. With respect to our human capital
20For sake of brevity, we omit the relevant tables here. Of course, they are available upon request from
the authors.
17variables, we get mixed results. Whereas the descriptive statistics partly point out such
an eﬀect, it is not reconﬁrmed in the regression results. As mentioned above, these last
results should be handled with precaution, however, due to the limitations of our proxy
variables.
4.2 How does milestone ﬁnancing work?
As mentioned above, the existence of suitable signals is a crucial prerequisite for the use
of milestone ﬁnancing. This is in strong contrast to round ﬁnancing which does not call
for a contingent contract to be feasible. Thus before analyzing the decision between the
diﬀerent staging modes in more detail in the next section, we want to investigate the
speciﬁcs of milestone ﬁnancing.
The essential requirement for milestone ﬁnancing is - as mentioned - the existence of
suitable milestones which must be able to describe the expected development of the ﬁrm
in the future. Therefore, the speciﬁc type used should heavily depend on the development
stage of the ﬁrm. We distinguish four diﬀerent categories of milestones in our data set:
product milestones such as the completion of a prototype or satisfactory product tests,
ﬁnancial milestones such as a minimum sales level or other (ﬁrm speciﬁc) milestones.
One typical example for these other milestones is the hiring of a speciﬁc type of manager
but this category comprises a broad range of diﬀerent milestones. Finally, we classify all
mixtures of diﬀerent milestone types as a separate category.
The descriptive statistics for the diﬀerent kinds of milestones can be found in table
9. These descriptive statistics give us ﬁrst insights that product and ﬁnancial milestones
seem to be used in successive development stages. We observe that product milestones
(in comparison to all other types of milestones) are used more frequently with a higher
absolute and relative degree of asymmetric information, for ﬁrms which are about to start
their development process and for which the entrepreneur’s human capital is crucial. On
the contrary, product milestones are used less often with ﬁrms which already entered the
market, which have a ﬁnished product, reference customers and reached break-even. By
comparison, ﬁnancial signals are more frequently used with a lower degree of asymmetric
information, in ﬁrms with reference customers and in which the entrepreneur’s human
capital is only of marginal importance. These results are also conﬁrmed by our univariate
probit regressions which we run with each milestones dummy as independent variable.
In table 10, we see that both AI and RAI as well as PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT are
signiﬁcant in the probit regressions for product milestones. This strengthens our result
that product milestones are rather used for ﬁrms in very early development stages, i.e. for
ﬁrms for which the product development is the main challenge. By contrast, as concerns
the regressions with FINANCIAL MILESTONE as independent variable, we ﬁnd that AGE,
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VELOPMENT is negative signiﬁcant. This, in turn, underlines our descriptive statistics
stating that ﬁnancial milestones are used with more developed ﬁrms as only for these kind
of ﬁrms ﬁnancial statements become really meaningful.
The remaining two milestone type categories, namely other, ﬁrm-speciﬁc milestones
and mixes, seem to be used in quite heterogeneous cases. The only variables that are
signiﬁcant in the regressions (see table 11) are the following: for other milestones, the
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT is negative signiﬁcant. This shows that if the ﬁrm is about
to start its product development process, other milestones are used less frequently. This
result is intuitive as product signals are certainly optimal in this case. The same insights
can be derived from our descriptive statistics, too. Interestingly, the mean of the expected
investment amount is signiﬁcantly higher for other milestones relative to all other types
of milestones: ﬁrms that need more funding to complete their project are more inclined
to use ﬁrm-speciﬁc milestones. As concerns signal mixes, we do not get any robust results
neither in the descriptive statistics nor in the univariate probit regressions. Mixes seem
to be used in quite heterogeneous cases which we are not able to identify given our data.
It is further interesting to see whether the use of speciﬁc milestones diﬀers between
mixes and pure milestone ﬁnancing. In table 8, we observe that product milestones are
used signiﬁcantly more with mixes than with pure milestone ﬁnancing; that there does
not exist a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the use of ﬁnancial and other milestones; and that
milestone mixes are used more with pure milestone ﬁnancing than with mixes (though the
diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant at the 11% level). In subsection 2.2, we noted that adequate
milestones must be available for the whole development process in order to be able to
implement pure milestone ﬁnancing. As product milestones cover only the ﬁrst part of
the development process, it is clear that they should be used more often with mixes
than with pure milestone ﬁnancing. As ﬁnancial and other milestones are used for more
advanced ﬁrms, they can, in principle, describe the remaining development process. This
implies that there should not exist a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the use of ﬁnancial and other
milestones between the two forms. The diﬀerence in the use of milestone mixes may be
explained by two facts: one the one hand, if suitable milestone mixes can be deﬁned, such
a mix is able to cover the whole development process; on the other hand, it is quite costly
to deﬁne a mix of diﬀerent milestones. Thus it is clear that milestone mixes are indeed
observed more often with pure milestone ﬁnancing than with mixes.
To conclude, our data gives us ﬁrst insights with respect to the use of diﬀerent mile-
stone types. We ﬁnd that product and ﬁnancial milestones are used in successive develop-
ment stages and that the availability of milestones seems to be important when choosing
one form of staging or another.
194.3 The determinants of the diﬀerent forms of staging
In this last section, we analyze the determinants of the choice of one of the diﬀerent forms
of staging by testing hypothesis 2. Once we look at the data, a major problem arises: in
contrast to the theoretical discussion that focuses on the diﬀerences between round and
milestone ﬁnancing, we additionally observe mixes of these two forms. Therefore, in a
ﬁrst step, we attempt to explain the appearance of mixes and reinterpret hypothesis 2
from this new perspective. Moreover, we have to discuss the instrumentalization of this
hypothesis. In a second step, we present descriptive results before running multinomial
probit models in order to identify the determinants of the use of the diﬀerent staging
forms. The section concludes with a summary of our results.
4.3.1 Instrumentalization of the hypothesis
Hypothesis 2 states that given feasibility of both forms of staging, round ﬁnancing relative
to milestone ﬁnancing should be the more probable, the better the entrepreneur’s outside
ﬁnancing option, the less pronounced the heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting
parties and the higher the total investment amount. In order to test this hypothesis,
adequate proxies for the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing option and the heterogeneity
of beliefs between the contracting parties as well as the total investment amount are
necessary. Moreover, we have to instrumentalize the feasibility aspect what will allow us
to explain the appearance of mixes.
As concerns feasibility, one has to distinguish the feasibility of milestone ﬁnancing and
the feasibility of round ﬁnancing. As concerns the feasibility of milestone ﬁnancing, the
crucial prerequisite is the availability of adequate milestones. This implies - as suggested
by our results about the characteristics of milestone ﬁnancing - that for very early stage
ﬁrms, pure milestone ﬁnancing may not be feasible because adequate milestones can only
be deﬁned for the near future and not for the whole development process. In this case,
round ﬁnancing is always necessary to implement staging. Then mixes between milestone
and round ﬁnancing may act as a second-best choice to overcome the negative eﬀects of
potential hold-up by the VC. This is due to the fact that with mixes in comparison to
pure rounds, a new ﬁnancing round only becomes necessary later on once more reliable
information exists. Still we have to bear in mind that ex post ﬂexibility is reduced when
using mixes. If pure milestone ﬁnancing is feasible, all three staging modes can be chosen
and the decision depends on the trade-oﬀ between the negative incentive eﬀect and ex
post ﬂexibility.
With respect to the feasibility of pure round ﬁnancing, we mentioned in subsection
2.2 that because of prohibitively high contracting costs, each round may have to cover
a minimum length. If this is the case, with pure round ﬁnancing, the eﬀect of staging
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abandoned only relatively late, for example. Consequently, a strong staging eﬀect can be
implemented solely by pure milestone ﬁnancing or mixes between rounds and milestones.
If we assume that for ﬁrms with a high degree of asymmetric information and uncertainty,
a strong staging eﬀect is more desirable, either pure milestone or mixes should be used
with these ﬁrms. In this case, mixes may act as a second-best alternative to reduce the
loss of ex post ﬂexibility.
With these two problems in mind, we can concretize hypothesis 2. In addition, we
conjecture that heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting parties is only relevant
with early stage ﬁrms. If the feasibility of milestone ﬁnancing is the limiting factor, we
get the following modiﬁed hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a:
• Pure milestone ﬁnancing relative to both pure round ﬁnancing and mixes should be
observed more frequently with more advanced ﬁrms for which adequate milestones
can be deﬁned for the whole remaining development process.
• Pure milestone ﬁnancing relative to pure round ﬁnancing and mixes should be ob-
served more frequently for ﬁrms with a worse outside ﬁnancing option and with a
lower total investment amount.
• Mixes relative to pure round ﬁnancing should be observed more frequently for ﬁrms
with a worse outside ﬁnancing option and with a more pronounced heterogeneity of
beliefs between the contracting parties.
If the feasibility of round ﬁnancing is the limiting factor, we get the following competing
modiﬁed hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b:
• Pure round ﬁnancing relative to both mixes and pure milestone ﬁnancing should be
observed more frequently with more advanced ﬁrms for which a strong staging eﬀect
is no longer necessary.
• Pure round ﬁnancing relative to pure milestone ﬁnancing and mixes should be ob-
served more frequently for ﬁrms with a better outside ﬁnancing option and with a
higher total investment amount.
• Mixes relative to pure milestone ﬁnancing should be observed more frequently for
ﬁrms with a better outside ﬁnancing option, with a less pronounced heterogeneity of
beliefs between the contracting parties and with a higher total investment amount.
In order to test these modiﬁed statements about the determinants of the diﬀerent
forms of staging, we need suitable proxy variables for the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing
option, the degree of heterogeneity of beliefs as well as the total investment amount.
21With respect to the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing option, we conjecture that both
the information available when conditions are renegotiated as well as previous contacts
with other investors besides the VC may play a crucial role. If the VC, as an inside investor,
refuses to continue to fund a project, this is a negative signal for outside investors. Thus
the entrepreneur has to convince possible investors of the proﬁtability of his project.
Therefore, he needs credible, hard information. This means that the degree of asymmetric
information must be relatively low. In addition, in an advanced development stage, the
ﬁrm has already established a relatively long track record. This, of course, may also help to
ameliorate the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing option. On the other hand, if the project
was or is ﬁnanced by ﬁnancial intermediaries other than the (lead) VC (banks, syndicating
VCs, angels), the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing option is better as he may also resort
to these (former) inside investors for new funding.
With respect to the heterogeneity of beliefs, we conjecture that it should be the more
pronounced the higher the degree of asymmetric information and uncertainty because each
contracting party holds its own expectations about the future. Naturally, entrepreneurs
tend to be more optimistic than VCs. However, as soon as hard facts exist about the
proﬁtability of the project, beliefs should become less subjective and therefore more ho-
mogeneous.
In order to reﬂect the mentioned ideas, we use diﬀerent indicator variables for the de-
velopment stage of the ﬁrm (PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, MARKET ENTRY), the degree
of asymmetric information (AI, its single components and RAI to reduce the developmental
aspect), the tangibility of assets (FAR) and the existence of further investors (OUTSIDE
FINANCE). Moreover, we use the expected balance sheet EBS as a proxy for the total
investment size. Finally, we use E EXPERT as a proxy variable for the importance of the
entrepreneur’s human capital because we expect the negative incentive eﬀect of poten-
tial hold-up by the VC to be the more harmful the more important the entrepreneur’s
contribution.
4.3.2 Descriptive results
We start by comparing the means of ﬁrms that use pure milestones to those that use
pure round ﬁnancing. The summary statistics are given in table 12. We observe that
ﬁrm characteristics do not play any signiﬁcant role. This may be explained by the fact
that the mentioned feasibility problems are both relevant and that therefore, there do
not exist any signiﬁcant diﬀerences. But we observe that the expected funding needs
(EBS) are signiﬁcantly higher with milestones. This contradicts the argument of Cuny
and Talmor (2004) [9] that milestone ﬁnancing should be used less often with higher
investment amounts because it reduces the entrepreneur’s incentives. The result should
22be handled with precaution because of the limitations of our variable21. However, the
result can also be interpreted from a diﬀerent angle: when the entrepreneur’s ﬁnancing
needs are relatively large, he crucially depends on the subsequent injection of funds. This
implies that it should be more diﬃcult to ﬁnd an outside investor due to the relatively
high amount of funding necessary, i.e. to his relatively bad outside ﬁnancing option. This
argument is further underlined by the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the means of OUTSIDE
FINANCE. In addition, there are both VC and time eﬀects.
The decision between pure milestone ﬁnancing and a mix of milestone and round
ﬁnancing, on the other hand, is determined by ﬁrm characteristics. If the degree of asym-
metric information decreases, pure milestone ﬁnancing becomes more probable than mixes.
The same is true for RAI. In addition, the means of diﬀerent variables that proxy for the
development stage of the ﬁrm diﬀer signiﬁcantly, indicating that milestone ﬁnancing is
rather used with more developed ﬁrms. See, for example, PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT,
MARKET ENTRY, FINISHED PRODUCT as well as REVENUES. This supports hypoth-
esis 2a and more concretely the assumption that the foreseeability aspect is crucial: pure
milestone ﬁnancing can only be implemented for more developed ﬁrms for which ade-
quate milestones can be deﬁned. At the same time, this contradicts hypothesis 2b which
predicts that both forms of staging should be equally likely for early stage ﬁrms. On the
other hand, we ﬁnd evidence for the impact of the hold-up problem on the choice of one
of these two forms of staging. First, the mean of the expected funding needs (EBS) is
signiﬁcantly higher for pure milestone ﬁnancing. This underlines again that the outside
option of the entrepreneur is the worse, the higher the funding needs and thus, milestone
ﬁnancing is more advantageous. Second, the mean of OUTSIDE FINANCE is signiﬁcantly
lower for ﬁrms that use milestone ﬁnancing: mixes are used more frequently when other
ﬁnancial intermediaries than the (lead) VC are or were involved in the ﬁrm. Then the
outside ﬁnancing option of the entrepreneur is better and so the negative impact of round
ﬁnancing decreases. Finally, there are VC type eﬀects.
In a last step, we consider the decision between pure round ﬁnancing and mixes. We
see that the mean of PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT is signiﬁcantly higher for mixes than for
pure round ﬁnancing. The same is true for E-EXPERT as well as its component RESEARCH
DEGREE. Consequently, a ﬁrm in an earlier development stage, which is confronted with
a higher degree of uncertainty and for which the entrepreneur’s human capital is crucial,
tends to use more mixes than pure round ﬁnancing22. This result can be explained by both
hypotheses: given the foreseeability problem, mixes are the best way to avoid hold-up by
the VC when pure milestone ﬁnancing is impossible because adequate milestones cannot
be deﬁned for the whole development process ex ante. The hold-up problem is expected
21The variable where we coded the negative values as zeros also turned out to be insigniﬁcant.
22This result is further emphasized by the dummy REFERENCE CUSTOMERS.
23to be the more pronounced, the less developed the ﬁrm in the moment of investment: the
less developed the ﬁrm, the smaller the probability that hard facts about its success are
available when new funding becomes necessary. Thus hypothesis 2a is conﬁrmed. On the
other hand, given the contracting cost problem, round ﬁnancing is not desirable for rather
early stage ﬁrms and in this case, mixes are the second-best choice. Thus hypothesis 2b
is also conﬁrmed. Finally, VC eﬀects and time eﬀects can be observed.
To conclude, we ﬁnd that although hypothesis 2a is broadly conﬁrmed by our de-
scriptive statistics, hypothesis 2b cannot be completely rejected: both the deﬁnition of
adequate milestones for the whole development process as well as the minimum dura-
tion of pure round ﬁnancing seem to be limiting factors. In addition, the inﬂuence of the
hold-up potential by the VC is crucial in the choice of one speciﬁc form of staging.
4.3.3 Regression results
As pointed out above, we are interested in identifying the determinants of the diﬀerent
forms of staging given that staging is to be implemented. The contracting parties maximize
the utility they derive from a speciﬁc form of staging by taking into account the advantages
and disadvantages of each form. In order to reﬂect this unobserved utility maximization,
we use a discrete choice model. As we want to test two competing hypotheses which imply
diﬀerent logical orders for the three staging modes, we refrain from implementing such
an order empirically. Therefore, the appropriate model in our situation is an unordered
multinomial logit or probit model. In fact, we will run multinominal probit regressions
with varying base categories to avoid the IIA assumption implicit in the multinomial logit
model. The results are given in tables 13 and 14.
With respect to the decision between pure milestone ﬁnancing and pure round ﬁnanc-
ing, we get the following results: pure milestone ﬁnancing is used signiﬁcantly more often
for ﬁrms which have already entered the market and that are confronted with a lower
degree of asymmetric information (measured by both AI and RAI). This means that mile-
stones in comparison to pure round ﬁnancing are rather used for more advanced ﬁrms
for which the project’s development is predictable and thus adequate milestones can be
implemented. This result clearly contradicts hypothesis 2b and conﬁrms hypothesis 2a:
the feasibility of milestone ﬁnancing seems to be the crucial limitation when choosing
between the diﬀerent forms of staging. In addition, OUTSIDE FINANCE is negative and
highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. This indicates that milestone ﬁnancing is used when
the entrepreneur’s outside option is relatively low as he cannot resort to former investors or
additional syndicating partners when the (lead) VC denies further funding. The expected
investment amount (EBS) does not turn out to be signiﬁcant in our regressions anymore
when explicitly controlling for the outside ﬁnancing option. Thus besides the feasibility
24aspect the impact of potential hold-up by the VC is the crucial determinant. Finally, the
time and VC eﬀects which we observe in the descriptive statistics are conﬁrmed: public
VCs use signiﬁcantly more pure milestone ﬁnancing and in period 1, signiﬁcantly less
pure milestone ﬁnancing is used whereas in period 3 signiﬁcantly more pure milestone
ﬁnancing is used. This indicates a steady decline in the use of pure round ﬁnancing.
With respect to the use of mixes relative to pure round ﬁnancing, we ﬁnd that mixes
are more often used for very early stage ﬁrms, i.e. for ﬁrms which are on the verge of
starting their product development process. This underlines hypothesis 2a that mixes
are implemented to avoid hold-up when pure milestone ﬁnancing is not feasible, i.e. for
very early stage ﬁrms where the project’s development path is unpredictable and the
probability that hard facts will be available when new funding becomes necessary is very
low. In addition, we again observe time and VC eﬀects: mixes are used signiﬁcantly less in
period 1 and public and independent VCs are more inclined to use mixes in comparison
to pure rounds. The results for independent VCs are not robust, however.
Finally, as concerns the use of mixes relative to pure milestone ﬁnancing, we observe
that mixes are more often used when the product development is about to start, the ﬁrm
has not already entered the market, the degree of asymmetric information is relatively
high and the entrepreneur’s human capital is crucial. While this seems counterintuitive
at a ﬁrst view, it underlines hypothesis 2a, i.e. the foreseeability aspect, namely that
milestone ﬁnancing is not implementable for very early stage ﬁrms. At the same time,
it contradicts hypothesis 2b which predicts that both forms are to be used in the same
development stages. Moreover, OUTSIDE FINANCE is negative. Although the coeﬃcients
are not signiﬁcant in all our speciﬁcation, the sign is always correct, indicating that mile-
stone ﬁnancing is rather used when the hold-up potential is pronounced, i.e. when the
entrepreneur cannot resort to other (known) ﬁnanciers. This means that both foreseeabil-
ity and renegotiation aspects are important when choosing milestone ﬁnancing or mixes.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the VC and time eﬀects are not robust in our regressions but there is
a tendency that independent VCs use signiﬁcantly less pure milestones and that in period
3, signiﬁcantly more pure milestone ﬁnancing was used.
Thus we can state that the descriptive results are in line with the regressions and
thus with hypothesis 2a. All in all, this means that there exist two diﬀerent determinants:
ﬁrst of all, foreseeability decides whether pure milestone ﬁnancing is feasible; second,
the intensity of the hold-up problem determines the choice between the available forms
of staging. Contracting cost arguments do not seem to play an important role for the
feasibility of round ﬁnancing.
254.3.4 Summary
To sum up, the choice between the diﬀerent forms of staging is driven by the anticipation
of the impact of renegotiation possibilities: we ﬁnd that contracts are the more complete,
the more pronounced the negative expected incentive eﬀect for the entrepreneur caused
by the VC’s hold-up. At the same time, the foreseeability of the project’s development
severely restricts contract completeness by rendering milestone ﬁnancing impossible.
Complete contingent contracts are only feasible if foreseeability is given. This implies
that pure milestone ﬁnancing should be more probable for more advanced ﬁrms what is
broadly conﬁrmed by our data. If foreseeability is given, milestone ﬁnancing should be
used more often than mixes if the negative incentive eﬀect is pronounced. The same should
be true for the comparison between pure milestone ﬁnancing and round ﬁnancing. Again,
this is just what we ﬁnd in our data: if the entrepreneur has a good outside ﬁnancing
option due to contacts to former investors or other investors in the syndicate, the hold-up
potential and therefore, the negative incentive eﬀects are less pronounced23. Consequently,
milestone ﬁnancing is used less frequently than mixes and than pure rounds.
If complete contingent contracts cannot be implemented because foreseeability is not
given, the choice to be made is only between mixes and pure round ﬁnancing. In this case,
mixes are the most complete contracts available. Thus mixes should be used more often
than pure rounds when the impact of potential renegotiation is pronounced. Indeed, the
data shows that mixes are used with less developed ﬁrms for which hard information is
not expected to be available in the near future and consequently, outside funding will be
diﬃcult to obtain.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of staging per se as well as its
diﬀerent modes. Thereby, we do not only focus on the VC speciﬁc literature but also on
the literature on renegotiation to deduce relevant hypotheses which we test against our
data.
We ﬁnd that the decision for staging is driven by the extent of asymmetric information
and uncertainty in the ﬁrm. It is important to keep in mind that we proxy for asymmetric
23In order to test the robustness of OUTSIDE FINANCE, we ignore the existence of syndicating VCs for
a moment. We conjecture, however, that the possibility to resort to syndicating partners is crucial for
the entrepreneur when the (lead) VC denies further funding. This is especially important as syndicating
partners have a further informational advantage in comparison to former investors which ﬁnanced the
venture before the initial VC investment. It turns out that, as expected, this alternative speciﬁcation
hardly yields any signiﬁcant results anymore. However, there is no contradiction with respect to the
previous mentioned results either. For sake of brevity, we omit the relevant tables here. Of course, they
are available upon request from the authors.
26information by taking a developmental perspective. On the contrary, the tangibility of
assets and the entrepreneur’s human capital do not matter. With respect to these results,
it is important to keep in mind the limitations of our variables. Still, the results are quite
robust and in line with earlier studies based on US data.
As regards the characteristics of milestone ﬁnancing, we present evidence that the type
of milestone used depends on the position of the ﬁrm in its development process. Very
early stage ﬁrms tend to use product milestones while developed ﬁrms use ﬁnancial or
other milestones. Moreover, product milestones seem to be used more often with mixes
between round and milestone ﬁnancing. Mixes of diﬀerent types of milestones, on the
other hand, seem to be used more often with pure milestone ﬁnancing.
Finally, we are able to show that for the decision between the diﬀerent forms of staging
the investment amount does not seem to play a signiﬁcant role. Rather the trade-oﬀ
between the anticipation of the impact of renegotiation on the entrepreneur’s incentives
and the desired ex post ﬂexibility is decisive: the more pronounced the negative incentive
eﬀect caused by renegotiation, the more complete contracts should be in order to limit
hold-up by the VC. However, the degree of contract completeness is restrained by the need
for predictability of the project’s development path. If this is not the case, pure milestones
(and therefore complete contracts) are impossible to deﬁne and mixes present a second-
best choice to overcome the negative incentive eﬀect. Both aspects are conﬁrmed by our
data. To be more precise, we show that pure milestone ﬁnancing is used less frequently for
very early stage ﬁrms for which predictability is less probable. Our data further conﬁrms
that the degree of contract completeness depends on the entrepreneur’s outside ﬁnancing
option which we measure in two forms: ﬁrst, we look whether external funding before the
investment of the VC has taken place or whether the investment is (or was) made via a
syndicate of VCs and second whether hard information is available.
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296 Tables
Table 1: Sample Selection
-1997 1998 - 2000 2000 - 2004 Total
1 51 102 22 175
10 0 12 4 16
11 0 8 1 9
100 4 16 2 22
1000 1 33 32 66
1001 0 6 3 9
1010 0 1 1 2
1011 0 1 0 1
Total 56 179 65 300
Notes: 1 = Technology Participation Programme (KfW/BMWA + KfW/BMTF - Technologie-Beteiligungsprogramm); 10
= ERP-Innovation Programme (ERP-Innovationsprogramm (Beteiligungsvariante)); 100 = Guarantee Programme (KfW-
Risikokapitalprogramm - Garantien); 1000 = Fund Programme (KFW-Risikokapitalprogramm - Fondsﬁnanzierung); and mixes
Table 2: Summary Statistics I: Security Choice
Category Equity Debt & Equity Convertibles Debt
Description Pure Equity Debt> Debt< US Style Convertible Mixes Nonstandard Pure
Equity + LP Equity Equity Equity Debt Debt
Category 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 4 9
Upside Cash Flow Rights X X X X X X X X -
Downside Protection - X X - X X X X X
Change of Control - - X X X - X X X
Cash Flow Rights at Exit X X X X X X X - -
Voting Rights X X X X - X X - -
51 85 157 20 11 10 16 11 96
Total Percentage 29% 38% 8% 23%
Notes: We report the VC’s security choice which is categorized according to the indicated ﬁve characteristics. We were confronted
with 7 missing values.
Table 3: Summary Statistics II: Staging Behavior
No Staging Staging Pure Milestones Pure Rounds Mixes
Complete Sample 135 (0.30) 311 (0.70) 53 (0.17) 181 (0.59) 73 (0.24)
Period 1 18 (0.28) 46 (0.72) 3 (0.07) 38 (0.86) 3 (0.07)
Period 2 86 (0.34) 167 (0.66) 25 (0.16) 93 (0.59) 39 (0.25)
Period 3 33 (0.24) 106 (0.76) 25 (0.24) 50 (0.47) 31 (0.29)
Independent VC 66 (0.31) 215 (0.69) 28 (0.14) 117 (0.57) 60 (0.29)
Public VC 44 (0.45) 54 (0.55) 17 (0.32) 27 (0.51) 9 (0.17)
Other VC Types 27 (0.36) 48 (0.64) 7 (0.15) 36 (0.77) 4 (0.09)
Notes: The ﬁrst column refers to the number of observations and the second to the percentage.
30T
a
b
l
e
4
:
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
f
o
r
S
t
a
g
i
n
g
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
S
t
a
g
i
n
g
N
o
s
t
a
g
i
n
g
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
O
b
s
M
e
a
n
S
t
d
.
D
e
v
.
M
i
n
M
a
x
O
b
s
M
e
a
n
S
t
d
.
D
e
v
.
M
i
n
M
a
x
O
b
s
M
e
a
n
S
t
d
.
D
e
v
.
M
i
n
M
a
x
A
g
e
4
4
0
5
.
0
8
2
1
3
.
3
9
0
1
2
8
3
0
7
3
.
3
5
8
*
*
*
7
.
7
5
4
0
1
2
5
1
2
8
9
.
3
5
9
2
1
.
1
7
3
0
1
2
8
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
4
2
6
0
.
7
2
8
0
.
4
4
6
0
1
2
9
2
0
.
7
9
1
*
*
*
0
.
4
0
7
0
1
1
2
9
0
.
5
8
1
0
.
4
9
5
0
1
A
I
3
1
3
2
.
0
6
4
1
.
3
7
6
0
4
2
0
9
1
.
8
4
2
*
*
*
1
.
3
2
6
0
4
1
0
2
2
.
5
2
0
1
.
3
7
0
4
R
A
I
2
9
7
1
.
0
0
0
0
.
6
6
9
0
2
.
5
6
1
9
8
0
.
9
6
0
0
.
6
9
3
0
2
.
5
6
9
8
1
.
0
8
5
0
.
6
1
5
0
2
.
5
6
E
B
S
3
2
8
0
.
8
8
6
0
.
1
8
5
0
.
0
7
6
1
2
2
5
0
.
8
8
9
0
.
1
7
5
0
.
1
4
4
1
9
6
0
.
8
7
4
0
.
2
1
2
0
.
0
7
6
1
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
3
3
2
0
.
8
0
1
0
.
4
0
0
0
1
2
2
5
0
.
7
6
4
*
*
0
.
4
2
5
0
1
1
0
2
0
.
8
7
3
0
.
3
3
5
0
1
E
E
x
p
e
r
t
4
3
9
0
.
2
0
7
0
.
4
0
6
0
1
3
0
3
0
.
2
2
1
0
.
4
1
6
0
1
1
3
0
0
.
1
8
5
0
.
3
8
9
0
1
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
4
1
3
0
.
2
0
8
0
.
4
0
7
0
1
2
8
0
0
.
2
3
6
*
*
0
.
4
2
5
0
1
1
2
8
0
.
1
4
1
0
.
3
4
9
0
1
M
a
r
k
e
t
E
n
t
r
y
3
9
5
0
.
4
6
1
0
.
4
9
9
0
1
2
7
4
0
.
4
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
4
9
1
0
1
1
1
7
0
.
5
9
8
0
.
4
9
2
0
1
B
r
e
a
k
E
v
e
n
3
8
4
0
.
2
4
5
0
.
4
3
1
0
1
2
6
0
0
.
1
6
5
*
*
*
0
.
3
7
2
0
1
1
1
9
0
.
4
1
2
0
.
4
9
4
0
1
O
u
t
s
i
d
e
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
4
1
4
0
.
5
4
8
0
.
4
9
8
0
1
2
9
1
0
.
5
5
3
0
.
4
9
8
0
1
1
1
7
0
.
5
3
0
0
.
5
0
1
0
1
A
u
d
.
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
S
h
e
e
t
3
9
2
0
.
6
3
5
0
.
4
8
2
0
1
2
7
3
0
.
5
9
0
*
*
*
0
.
4
9
3
0
1
1
1
5
0
.
7
3
0
0
.
4
4
6
0
1
F
A
R
4
1
0
0
.
2
2
1
0
.
3
3
5
-
.
4
1
8
4
.
2
4
2
8
1
0
.
2
0
3
0
.
3
4
2
-
0
.
0
7
6
4
.
2
4
1
2
2
0
.
2
5
9
0
.
3
2
0
-
.
4
1
8
2
.
4
4
P
a
t
e
n
t
s
4
6
4
0
.
3
4
7
0
.
4
7
7
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
3
7
3
0
.
4
8
4
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
3
0
7
0
.
4
6
3
0
1
R
e
p
e
a
t
E
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
3
9
4
0
.
3
5
0
0
.
4
7
8
0
1
2
7
7
0
.
3
4
3
0
.
4
7
6
0
1
1
1
2
0
.
3
5
7
0
.
4
8
1
0
1
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d
4
0
4
0
.
9
1
6
0
.
2
7
8
0
1
2
9
1
0
.
9
0
4
0
.
2
9
5
0
1
1
0
8
0
.
9
4
4
0
.
2
3
0
0
1
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
D
e
g
r
e
e
3
9
1
0
.
4
5
5
0
.
4
9
9
0
1
2
8
2
0
.
4
7
9
*
0
.
5
0
0
0
1
1
0
4
0
.
3
8
5
0
.
4
8
9
0
1
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
4
4
5
0
.
5
6
2
0
.
4
9
7
0
1
3
0
5
0
.
5
0
8
*
*
*
0
.
5
0
1
0
1
1
3
5
0
.
6
8
1
0
.
4
6
8
0
1
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
C
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
s
4
0
6
0
.
5
5
2
0
.
4
9
8
0
1
2
7
3
0
.
5
1
6
*
*
0
.
5
0
1
0
1
1
2
8
0
.
6
2
5
0
.
4
8
6
0
1
D
e
b
t
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
4
5
7
0
.
2
9
3
0
.
4
5
6
0
1
3
1
3
0
.
2
6
8
*
*
0
.
4
4
4
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
3
6
5
0
.
4
8
3
0
1
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
C
4
6
2
0
.
6
1
7
0
.
4
8
7
0
1
3
1
8
0
.
6
7
6
*
*
*
0
.
4
6
9
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
4
8
2
0
.
5
0
2
0
1
P
u
b
l
i
c
V
C
4
6
2
0
.
2
1
2
0
.
4
0
9
0
1
3
1
8
0
.
1
7
0
*
*
*
0
.
3
7
6
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
3
2
1
0
.
4
6
9
0
1
O
t
h
e
r
V
C
4
6
1
0
.
1
6
9
0
.
3
7
5
0
1
3
1
7
0
.
1
5
1
0
.
3
5
9
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
1
9
7
0
.
3
9
9
0
1
P
e
r
i
o
d
1
4
6
4
0
.
1
4
4
0
.
3
5
2
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
1
4
4
0
.
3
5
2
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
1
3
1
0
.
3
3
9
0
1
P
e
r
i
o
d
2
4
6
4
0
.
5
5
4
0
.
4
9
8
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
5
2
4
*
*
0
.
5
0
0
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
6
2
8
0
.
4
8
5
0
1
P
e
r
i
o
d
3
4
6
4
0
.
3
0
2
0
.
4
6
0
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
3
3
2
*
*
0
.
4
7
2
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
2
4
1
0
.
4
2
9
0
1
L
i
f
e
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
s
4
6
4
0
.
2
0
7
0
.
4
0
6
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
2
4
1
*
*
*
0
.
4
2
9
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
1
3
9
0
.
3
4
7
0
1
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
4
6
4
0
.
0
9
7
0
.
2
9
6
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
1
1
3
*
0
.
3
1
7
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
0
6
6
0
.
2
4
9
0
1
I
T
/
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
4
6
4
0
.
3
6
0
0
.
4
8
0
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
3
7
3
0
.
4
8
4
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
3
2
8
0
.
4
7
1
0
1
T
r
a
d
.
H
i
g
h
-
T
e
c
h
4
6
4
0
.
1
9
6
0
.
3
9
7
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
1
6
6
*
*
0
.
3
7
3
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
2
6
3
0
.
4
4
2
0
1
O
t
h
e
r
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
4
6
4
0
.
1
4
0
0
.
3
4
7
0
1
3
1
9
0
.
1
0
7
*
*
0
.
3
0
9
0
1
1
3
7
0
.
2
0
4
0
.
4
0
5
0
1
N
o
t
e
s
:
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
s
u
m
m
a
r
y
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
o
f
a
l
l
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
T
-
t
e
s
t
s
w
i
t
h
u
n
e
q
u
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
s
a
r
e
m
a
d
e
f
o
r
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
s
t
a
g
e
d
a
n
d
n
o
n
-
s
t
a
g
e
d
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
i
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
b
y
*
,
*
*
,
*
*
*
f
o
r
t
h
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
l
e
v
e
l
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
31T
a
b
l
e
5
:
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
(
1
0
)
(
1
1
)
(
1
2
)
(
1
3
(
1
4
)
(
1
5
)
A
g
e
(
1
)
1
.
0
0
0
0
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
(
2
)
-
0
.
3
6
9
5
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
A
I
(
3
)
0
.
3
4
2
9
*
-
0
.
5
4
3
0
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
R
A
I
(
4
)
0
.
1
0
2
2
*
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
8
0
8
5
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
(
5
)
0
.
1
4
4
1
*
-
0
.
2
1
5
5
*
0
.
4
6
7
7
*
0
.
4
0
0
0
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
E
B
S
(
6
)
-
0
.
4
2
9
9
*
0
.
3
5
7
2
*
-
0
.
2
1
3
1
*
-
0
.
0
1
8
2
0
.
0
0
1
5
1
.
0
0
0
0
E
E
x
p
e
r
t
(
7
)
-
0
.
1
1
4
0
*
0
.
2
6
4
9
*
-
0
.
5
8
3
0
*
-
0
.
5
1
3
6
*
-
0
.
3
5
1
9
*
0
.
0
6
7
1
1
.
0
0
0
0
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
(
8
)
-
0
.
1
3
8
1
*
0
.
2
7
1
9
*
-
0
.
5
9
5
5
*
-
0
.
5
4
8
2
*
0
.
1
2
9
2
*
-
0
.
1
9
2
1
*
0
.
4
7
3
1
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
M
a
r
k
e
t
E
n
t
r
y
(
9
)
0
.
2
6
1
3
*
-
0
.
3
8
7
3
*
0
.
8
2
9
7
*
0
.
6
7
6
0
*
0
.
5
8
2
1
*
-
0
.
1
9
9
1
*
-
0
.
5
3
5
7
*
-
0
.
5
7
7
2
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
B
r
e
a
k
E
v
e
n
(
1
0
)
0
.
2
8
2
0
*
-
0
.
4
6
6
3
*
0
.
6
1
0
6
*
0
.
3
2
9
4
*
0
.
2
6
6
8
*
-
0
.
1
3
6
5
*
-
0
.
1
7
2
5
*
-
0
.
1
8
6
6
*
0
.
3
0
5
3
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
O
u
t
s
i
d
e
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
(
1
1
)
0
.
1
1
9
5
*
-
0
.
2
0
2
0
*
0
.
1
0
6
5
*
-
0
.
0
0
8
1
-
0
.
0
6
2
9
-
0
.
2
3
0
1
*
0
.
0
6
3
0
0
.
0
2
3
2
0
.
0
7
5
6
-
0
.
0
1
2
3
1
.
0
0
0
0
A
u
d
.
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
S
h
e
e
t
(
1
2
)
0
.
2
3
9
5
*
-
0
.
3
2
2
9
*
0
.
7
3
8
8
*
0
.
6
6
4
6
*
0
.
3
8
0
6
*
-
0
.
1
5
9
4
*
-
0
.
3
4
6
4
*
-
0
.
3
4
5
6
*
0
.
5
7
6
7
*
0
.
3
1
6
2
*
0
.
0
5
5
3
1
.
0
0
0
0
F
A
R
(
1
3
)
0
.
1
4
8
8
*
-
0
.
2
0
1
4
*
0
.
2
2
5
7
*
0
.
1
2
1
9
*
0
.
0
8
1
3
-
0
.
1
6
1
5
*
-
0
.
0
2
3
8
-
0
.
1
1
6
5
*
0
.
1
6
9
7
*
0
.
2
1
5
2
*
0
.
1
0
7
4
*
0
.
2
7
3
2
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
P
a
t
e
n
t
s
(
1
4
)
-
0
.
0
2
7
1
0
.
1
7
2
3
*
-
0
.
2
3
2
8
*
-
0
.
0
7
3
0
-
0
.
1
5
7
3
*
-
0
.
1
2
4
3
*
0
.
2
9
5
6
*
0
.
0
6
1
8
-
0
.
1
5
4
0
*
-
0
.
1
8
5
2
*
0
.
0
4
1
3
-
0
.
0
5
4
5
0
.
1
0
0
9
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
R
e
p
e
a
t
E
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
(
1
5
)
0
.
1
5
6
3
*
-
0
.
0
1
5
8
0
.
1
0
0
2
*
0
.
1
1
2
9
*
0
.
0
2
0
9
-
0
.
1
1
5
0
*
-
0
.
1
5
6
5
*
-
0
.
1
0
3
7
*
0
.
0
2
0
9
0
.
0
0
9
6
0
.
0
5
3
0
0
.
0
5
5
0
-
0
.
0
1
1
3
-
0
.
0
0
9
2
1
.
0
0
0
0
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d
(
1
6
)
0
.
0
5
5
7
0
.
0
1
7
8
-
0
.
0
1
1
8
0
.
0
3
8
5
-
0
.
0
0
7
3
-
0
.
0
4
1
6
0
.
1
4
6
5
*
-
0
.
0
7
4
1
-
0
.
0
3
3
0
0
.
0
3
1
2
-
0
.
0
7
2
9
0
.
0
4
3
7
0
.
0
8
0
2
0
.
2
0
2
5
*
0
.
0
3
6
7
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
D
e
g
r
e
e
(
1
7
)
-
0
.
0
9
6
2
*
0
.
1
1
3
7
*
-
0
.
3
4
5
2
*
-
0
.
2
7
8
8
*
-
0
.
2
6
7
0
*
-
0
.
1
3
2
5
*
0
.
6
1
9
1
*
0
.
2
4
7
8
*
-
0
.
2
0
9
4
*
-
0
.
1
3
1
9
*
0
.
1
6
9
4
*
-
0
.
1
4
7
7
*
0
.
0
4
7
0
0
.
2
4
0
2
*
-
0
.
2
2
9
9
*
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
(
1
8
)
0
.
2
0
1
8
*
-
0
.
3
3
4
7
*
0
.
7
8
7
1
*
0
.
6
7
7
7
*
0
.
3
9
0
5
*
-
0
.
1
7
3
7
*
-
0
.
6
0
8
0
*
-
0
.
6
4
7
0
*
0
.
9
2
6
2
*
0
.
2
1
8
2
*
0
.
0
6
3
5
0
.
4
9
1
6
*
0
.
1
0
7
7
*
-
0
.
1
5
0
0
*
0
.
0
5
2
2
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
C
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
s
(
1
9
)
0
.
2
3
5
9
*
-
0
.
3
7
7
1
*
0
.
7
5
6
0
*
0
.
6
3
7
3
*
0
.
3
9
0
3
*
-
0
.
1
9
9
0
*
-
0
.
4
2
6
8
*
-
0
.
6
3
5
6
*
0
.
6
2
4
3
*
0
.
2
6
8
3
*
0
.
2
0
1
5
*
0
.
3
8
0
2
*
0
.
1
2
0
3
*
-
0
.
1
3
0
2
*
0
.
1
2
9
3
*
D
e
b
t
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
(
2
0
)
0
.
1
6
3
4
*
-
0
.
0
6
2
7
0
.
2
2
8
8
*
0
.
2
0
1
8
*
0
.
0
7
1
6
-
0
.
1
2
5
3
*
-
0
.
1
3
5
4
*
-
0
.
0
7
4
0
0
.
1
5
5
4
*
0
.
1
7
4
2
*
-
0
.
1
1
8
4
*
0
.
1
2
2
6
*
0
.
0
6
0
9
-
0
.
0
5
6
7
-
0
.
0
0
4
9
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
C
(
2
1
)
-
0
.
1
3
4
6
*
0
.
1
1
7
9
*
-
0
.
1
0
4
9
*
-
0
.
0
2
3
4
-
0
.
0
7
1
4
-
0
.
0
2
3
9
0
.
0
9
7
2
*
0
.
0
4
4
3
-
0
.
0
7
0
5
-
0
.
1
2
8
0
*
0
.
1
7
5
1
*
-
0
.
1
1
4
0
*
-
0
.
1
1
4
9
*
0
.
1
1
8
5
*
-
0
.
0
1
2
0
P
u
b
l
i
c
V
C
(
2
2
)
0
.
0
4
9
2
-
0
.
0
1
5
7
0
.
1
1
5
5
*
0
.
0
7
2
5
0
.
0
4
2
4
0
.
1
4
1
0
*
-
0
.
1
1
7
0
*
-
0
.
0
8
6
2
*
0
.
0
2
7
5
0
.
1
3
4
1
*
-
0
.
2
4
4
2
*
0
.
0
0
4
4
-
0
.
0
3
3
4
-
0
.
1
3
5
0
*
0
.
0
6
6
6
O
t
h
e
r
V
C
(
2
3
)
0
.
1
2
2
3
*
-
0
.
1
3
5
7
*
0
.
0
1
4
7
-
0
.
0
4
5
0
0
.
0
4
2
2
-
0
.
1
2
3
6
*
0
.
0
0
2
0
0
.
0
3
6
8
0
.
0
5
5
2
0
.
0
2
1
5
0
.
0
3
0
7
0
.
1
3
7
1
*
0
.
1
7
9
7
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
9
-
0
.
0
5
4
6
P
e
r
i
o
d
e
1
(
2
4
)
0
.
0
3
4
2
0
.
0
7
3
7
0
.
0
5
4
8
0
.
1
2
2
3
*
0
.
0
8
6
6
0
.
1
3
7
9
*
0
.
0
0
2
4
-
0
.
0
0
7
9
-
0
.
0
0
9
1
0
.
0
8
3
3
-
0
.
2
1
7
6
*
0
.
0
9
6
7
*
0
.
0
1
9
1
0
.
0
7
4
1
-
0
.
1
0
2
3
*
P
e
r
i
o
d
e
2
(
2
5
)
-
0
.
0
3
7
9
-
0
.
0
6
2
9
-
0
.
0
5
8
4
-
0
.
1
0
5
8
*
-
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
4
4
8
0
.
0
1
1
8
0
.
0
5
6
7
-
0
.
0
6
2
6
0
.
0
8
2
4
-
0
.
0
9
5
7
*
-
0
.
1
3
8
5
*
-
0
.
0
5
5
0
-
0
.
1
2
0
0
*
-
0
.
0
3
9
7
P
e
r
i
o
d
e
3
(
2
6
)
0
.
0
1
5
1
0
.
0
1
2
9
0
.
0
2
1
5
0
.
0
2
4
3
-
0
.
0
6
5
6
-
0
.
1
6
3
5
*
-
0
.
0
1
4
5
-
0
.
0
5
4
8
0
.
0
7
4
6
-
0
.
1
4
8
5
*
0
.
2
7
1
1
*
0
.
0
7
4
5
0
.
0
4
4
8
0
.
0
7
3
2
0
.
1
1
8
2
*
L
i
f
e
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
s
(
2
7
)
-
0
.
0
7
0
8
0
.
0
7
1
2
-
0
.
3
0
9
4
*
-
0
.
2
3
2
4
*
-
0
.
1
9
5
7
*
-
0
.
0
5
1
6
0
.
4
9
6
1
*
0
.
2
4
5
3
*
-
0
.
2
0
6
8
*
-
0
.
1
4
0
1
*
0
.
1
3
2
3
*
-
0
.
0
7
0
0
0
.
0
0
2
6
0
.
4
2
1
3
*
-
0
.
1
7
4
3
*
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
(
2
8
)
-
0
.
0
9
5
2
*
0
.
1
8
1
7
*
-
0
.
0
9
6
1
*
-
0
.
0
0
7
2
-
0
.
0
1
2
7
0
.
1
2
5
1
*
-
0
.
1
7
2
8
*
0
.
0
0
9
2
0
.
0
0
3
4
-
0
.
0
9
6
1
*
-
0
.
0
4
6
7
-
0
.
1
9
0
4
*
-
0
.
1
4
1
0
*
-
0
.
2
0
8
3
*
-
0
.
0
3
6
7
I
T
/
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
(
2
9
)
-
0
.
1
0
9
0
*
-
0
.
0
1
9
7
0
.
0
2
6
8
0
.
0
3
9
3
-
0
.
0
1
0
4
0
.
0
3
5
3
-
0
.
1
4
5
5
*
-
0
.
1
3
5
1
*
0
.
0
1
5
1
-
0
.
0
2
2
5
0
.
1
1
8
7
*
0
.
0
1
8
9
-
0
.
0
5
8
7
-
0
.
2
3
5
3
*
0
.
1
0
7
7
*
T
r
a
d
.
H
i
g
h
-
T
e
c
h
(
3
0
)
0
.
1
5
0
9
*
-
0
.
1
0
1
6
*
0
.
2
1
7
0
*
0
.
1
7
5
7
*
0
.
0
3
5
4
0
.
0
4
8
6
-
0
.
0
1
1
7
-
0
.
0
9
7
8
*
0
.
0
9
6
7
*
0
.
1
7
1
8
*
-
0
.
1
8
2
2
*
0
.
0
6
7
9
0
.
1
2
0
4
*
0
.
0
3
9
0
-
0
.
0
4
8
8
O
t
h
e
r
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
(
3
1
)
0
.
1
5
4
2
*
-
0
.
1
0
0
4
*
0
.
1
7
2
7
*
0
.
0
3
8
7
-
0
.
0
3
4
5
-
0
.
0
8
9
4
-
0
.
2
1
3
2
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
9
0
.
1
1
2
4
*
0
.
0
8
3
3
-
0
.
0
7
4
3
0
.
1
4
6
8
*
0
.
0
5
8
2
-
0
.
0
3
3
3
0
.
1
4
4
8
*
(
1
6
)
(
1
7
)
(
1
8
)
(
1
9
)
(
2
0
)
(
2
1
)
(
2
2
)
(
2
3
)
(
2
4
)
(
2
5
)
(
2
6
)
(
2
7
)
(
2
8
)
(
2
9
)
(
3
0
)
(
3
1
)
A
g
e
(
1
)
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
(
2
)
A
I
(
3
)
R
A
I
(
4
)
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
(
5
)
E
B
S
(
6
)
E
E
x
p
e
r
t
(
7
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
(
8
)
M
a
r
k
e
t
E
n
t
r
y
(
9
)
B
r
e
a
k
E
v
e
n
(
1
0
)
O
u
t
s
i
d
e
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
(
1
1
)
A
u
d
.
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
S
h
e
e
t
(
1
2
)
F
A
R
(
1
3
)
P
a
t
e
n
t
s
(
1
4
)
R
e
p
e
a
t
E
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
(
1
5
)
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d
(
1
6
)
1
.
0
0
0
0
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
D
e
g
r
e
e
(
1
7
)
0
.
1
3
4
8
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
(
1
8
)
-
0
.
0
1
2
7
-
0
.
2
3
3
8
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
C
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
s
(
1
9
)
-
0
.
0
2
6
0
-
0
.
2
5
8
3
*
0
.
5
6
7
9
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
D
e
b
t
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
(
2
0
)
0
.
0
3
0
8
-
0
.
1
0
8
7
*
0
.
1
3
6
3
*
0
.
1
2
8
5
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
C
(
2
1
)
-
0
.
1
1
3
2
*
0
.
0
8
1
2
-
0
.
0
5
1
4
0
.
0
5
8
9
-
0
.
3
7
7
9
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
P
u
b
l
i
c
V
C
(
2
2
)
0
.
0
8
2
4
*
-
0
.
0
9
9
9
*
0
.
0
2
1
7
-
0
.
0
3
7
2
0
.
3
4
6
5
*
-
0
.
6
5
8
4
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
O
t
h
e
r
V
C
(
2
3
)
0
.
0
5
7
3
-
0
.
0
0
4
3
0
.
0
3
8
5
-
0
.
0
4
1
2
0
.
1
0
4
6
*
-
0
.
5
7
4
3
*
-
0
.
2
3
4
5
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
P
e
r
i
o
d
1
(
2
4
)
0
.
1
2
2
9
*
0
.
0
0
7
4
-
0
.
0
2
4
0
0
.
0
2
4
0
0
.
1
7
2
9
*
-
0
.
2
0
6
5
*
0
.
1
4
7
2
*
0
.
0
9
6
4
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
P
e
r
i
o
d
2
(
2
5
)
-
0
.
0
7
7
4
-
0
.
0
9
0
8
*
-
0
.
0
6
9
6
-
0
.
1
2
0
9
*
-
0
.
0
5
0
1
0
.
0
5
1
0
-
0
.
0
3
2
9
-
0
.
0
2
5
0
-
0
.
4
5
7
7
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
P
e
r
i
o
d
3
(
2
6
)
-
0
.
0
0
9
3
0
.
0
9
2
7
*
0
.
0
9
2
7
*
0
.
1
1
2
2
*
-
0
.
0
7
8
1
*
0
.
1
0
3
0
*
-
0
.
0
7
7
2
*
-
0
.
0
4
6
4
-
0
.
2
7
0
0
*
-
0
.
7
3
2
4
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
L
i
f
e
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
s
(
2
7
)
0
.
1
6
3
5
*
0
.
4
3
9
6
*
-
0
.
2
3
6
7
*
-
0
.
1
9
9
4
*
-
0
.
0
8
1
2
*
0
.
1
1
8
3
*
-
0
.
1
2
2
2
*
-
0
.
0
1
7
7
0
.
0
4
7
5
-
0
.
0
9
8
2
*
0
.
0
6
9
9
1
.
0
0
0
0
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
(
2
8
)
-
0
.
4
2
9
6
*
-
0
.
1
4
3
9
*
0
.
0
6
5
0
-
0
.
0
5
8
7
-
0
.
0
8
3
8
*
0
.
1
6
4
7
*
-
0
.
1
1
4
2
*
-
0
.
0
8
7
5
*
-
0
.
1
3
4
6
*
0
.
1
1
8
3
*
-
0
.
0
2
5
0
-
0
.
1
6
7
4
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
I
T
/
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
(
2
9
)
0
.
1
0
1
0
*
-
0
.
1
8
8
4
*
0
.
0
2
1
2
0
.
1
1
0
7
*
-
0
.
0
5
5
3
0
.
0
6
4
7
-
0
.
0
2
6
7
-
0
.
0
5
1
2
-
0
.
1
1
6
4
*
0
.
0
4
0
7
0
.
0
4
5
1
-
0
.
3
8
3
0
*
-
0
.
2
4
5
7
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
T
r
a
d
.
H
i
g
h
-
T
e
c
h
(
3
0
)
0
.
1
2
3
1
*
-
0
.
0
1
0
3
0
.
0
7
4
6
0
.
0
8
3
4
*
0
.
1
6
4
5
*
-
0
.
2
1
4
2
*
0
.
1
2
9
1
*
0
.
1
3
9
6
*
0
.
1
2
1
4
*
-
0
.
0
3
7
2
-
0
.
0
5
2
7
-
0
.
2
5
2
3
*
-
0
.
1
6
1
9
*
-
0
.
3
7
0
4
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
O
t
h
e
r
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
(
3
1
)
-
0
.
1
0
9
1
*
-
0
.
1
4
4
4
*
0
.
1
0
6
8
*
0
.
0
3
4
4
0
.
0
5
4
2
-
0
.
1
2
2
2
*
0
.
1
2
9
1
*
0
.
0
0
5
7
0
.
0
8
1
5
*
-
0
.
0
0
0
0
-
0
.
0
6
2
4
-
0
.
2
0
6
1
*
-
0
.
1
3
2
3
*
-
0
.
3
0
2
7
*
-
0
.
1
9
9
4
*
1
.
0
0
0
0
N
o
t
e
s
:
P
a
i
r
w
i
s
e
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
4
6
4
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
r
o
u
n
d
s
i
n
t
o
2
9
0
e
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
i
a
l
ﬁ
r
m
s
.
A
s
t
e
r
i
c
s
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
0
%
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
.
32T
a
b
l
e
6
:
T
h
e
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
n
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
D
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
f
o
r
S
t
a
g
i
n
g
(
1
)
M
o
d
e
l
1
M
o
d
e
l
2
M
o
d
e
l
3
M
o
d
e
l
4
M
o
d
e
l
5
M
o
d
e
l
6
M
o
d
e
l
7
d
F
/
d
x
z
d
F
/
d
x
z
d
F
/
d
x
z
d
F
/
d
x
z
d
F
/
d
x
z
d
F
/
d
x
z
d
F
/
d
x
z
A
g
e
-
0
.
0
0
6
-
2
.
0
1
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
0
.
1
9
1
3
.
3
2
0
.
2
7
1
3
.
8
9
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
-
0
.
1
4
2
-
2
.
0
8
A
I
-
0
.
0
5
8
-
2
.
9
5
R
A
I
-
0
.
0
4
2
-
0
.
9
9
B
r
e
a
k
E
v
e
n
-
0
.
2
1
8
-
3
.
1
1
A
u
d
.
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
S
h
e
e
t
-
0
.
0
0
6
-
0
.
0
8
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
-
0
.
1
0
6
-
1
.
4
2
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
C
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
s
0
.
0
4
6
0
.
6
7
E
B
S
0
.
1
3
4
0
.
9
5
P
a
t
e
n
t
s
0
.
0
1
6
0
.
2
9
-
0
.
0
2
2
-
0
.
3
8
0
.
0
5
9
1
.
0
0
-
0
.
0
4
2
-
0
.
6
6
-
0
.
0
6
0
-
0
.
9
2
-
0
.
0
9
6
-
1
.
3
9
0
.
0
2
3
0
.
3
7
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
C
0
.
0
6
6
0
.
9
8
0
.
0
8
5
1
.
1
9
0
.
0
3
3
0
.
4
4
0
.
1
1
9
1
.
5
7
0
.
1
1
9
1
.
5
7
0
.
1
0
2
1
.
2
6
0
.
0
9
5
1
.
2
6
P
u
b
l
i
c
V
C
-
0
.
1
0
7
-
1
.
3
4
-
0
.
1
2
7
-
1
.
5
2
-
0
.
1
1
2
-
1
.
2
9
-
0
.
0
9
7
-
1
.
0
5
-
0
.
0
8
7
-
0
.
9
5
-
0
.
1
3
9
-
1
.
4
2
-
0
.
0
8
8
-
1
.
0
2
P
e
r
i
o
d
1
0
.
0
9
9
1
.
4
4
0
.
0
7
9
1
.
1
3
0
.
1
4
8
2
.
0
8
0
.
1
1
0
1
.
3
4
0
.
1
1
0
1
.
3
1
0
.
0
6
0
0
.
6
6
0
.
1
1
1
1
.
6
1
P
e
r
i
o
d
3
0
.
0
7
7
1
.
5
5
0
.
0
8
1
1
.
5
9
0
.
1
4
2
2
.
4
5
0
.
0
9
2
1
.
4
9
0
.
0
7
0
1
.
1
2
0
.
0
9
6
1
.
5
5
0
.
1
8
7
3
.
1
9
L
i
f
e
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
s
0
.
1
5
8
2
.
0
0
0
.
1
6
7
2
.
1
3
0
.
1
5
8
1
.
7
8
0
.
2
5
7
2
.
9
7
0
.
2
5
6
2
.
9
1
0
.
2
6
4
3
.
0
2
0
.
0
6
8
0
.
7
1
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
0
.
1
4
6
1
.
6
4
0
.
1
2
3
1
.
3
2
0
.
2
6
6
2
.
8
1
0
.
2
0
1
2
.
0
6
0
.
2
0
1
2
.
1
0
0
.
1
1
5
1
.
0
5
0
.
1
8
6
1
.
6
9
I
T
/
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
0
.
1
1
7
1
.
5
6
0
.
1
2
3
1
.
6
6
0
.
2
1
4
2
.
8
1
0
.
1
8
3
2
.
3
4
0
.
1
6
9
2
.
1
8
0
.
1
6
5
1
.
9
7
0
.
0
8
1
0
.
9
5
T
r
a
d
.
H
i
g
h
-
T
e
c
h
0
.
0
3
6
0
.
4
4
0
.
0
1
9
0
.
2
4
0
.
0
4
5
0
.
5
1
0
.
1
3
1
1
.
5
5
0
.
1
3
8
1
.
7
0
0
.
1
1
5
1
.
3
2
-
0
.
0
0
6
-
0
.
0
7
N
o
o
f
O
b
s
.
4
3
4
4
2
0
3
2
7
3
1
1
3
1
1
2
9
6
3
2
0
W
a
l
d
/
χ
2
3
1
.
3
4
4
5
.
5
0
3
6
.
6
2
4
2
.
9
0
5
7
.
2
7
4
8
.
0
2
2
6
.
8
7
P
r
o
b
.
0
.
0
0
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
2
7
R
2
0
.
0
7
8
7
0
.
0
9
3
7
0
.
0
9
7
1
0
.
1
1
4
6
0
.
1
3
1
4
0
.
1
4
2
9
0
.
0
7
4
8
L
o
g
L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
-
2
4
2
.
5
0
-
2
3
4
.
7
9
-
1
8
3
.
2
5
-
1
7
4
.
2
2
-
1
7
0
.
9
3
-
1
6
1
.
0
9
-
1
8
0
.
8
5
N
o
t
e
s
:
P
r
o
b
i
t
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
t
ﬁ
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
.
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
t
h
e
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
S
T
A
G
I
N
G
w
h
i
c
h
t
a
k
e
s
v
a
l
u
e
o
n
e
w
h
e
n
s
t
a
g
i
n
g
t
a
k
e
s
p
l
a
c
e
a
n
d
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
a
r
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
.
33Table 7: The Determinants of the Decision for Staging (2)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
FAR -0.073 -0.86 -0.148 -1.65
Age -0.006 -2.00 -0.024 -3.27
Early Stage 0.256 4.03 0.203 2.97
E Expert -0.027 -0.42 -0.081 -1.27 -0.114 -1.59
Science Background -0.052 -0.42 -0.068 -0.54 -0.092 -0.83
Repeat Entrepreneur -0.003 -0.06 0.017 0.32 -0.016 -0.29
Research Degree 0.049 0.85 0.003 0.05 0.048 0.81
Patents 0.014 0.26 0.013 0.22 0.012 0.22 -0.026 -0.44 -0.024 -0.40 -0.019 -0.31
Independent VC 0.083 1.17 0.086 1.13 0.073 1.06 0.114 1.49 0.078 1.08 0.081 1.04
Public VC -0.093 -1.15 -0.098 -1.07 -0.086 -1.05 -0.085 -0.90 -0.118 -1.38 -0.126 -1.29
Period 1 0.115 1.69 0.091 1.24 0.108 1.53 0.080 1.05 0.087 1.20 0.089 1.19
Period 3 0.119 2.24 0.098 1.77 0.076 1.49 0.063 1.10 0.087 1.67 0.067 1.19
Life Sciences 0.183 2.11 0.065 0.64 0.207 2.49 0.118 1.19 0.221 2.65 0.073 0.76
Internet 0.212 2.42 0.145 1.18 0.147 1.65 0.039 0.32 0.110 1.15 0.032 0.27
IT/Telecom 0.140 1.86 0.033 0.37 0.118 1.56 0.044 0.48 0.116 1.52 0.037 0.43
Trad. High-Tech 0.050 0.61 -0.029 -0.28 0.059 0.72 0.021 0.21 0.040 0.49 -0.045 -0.46
No of Obs. 383 298 411 322 400 311
Wald/χ2 33.99 22.23 31.90 25.05 48.18 28.42
Prob. 0.0004 0.0519 0.0008 0.0227 0.0000 0.0079
R2 0.0755 0.0635 0.0838 0.0851 0.1084 0.0823
Log Likelihood -216.37 -161.40 -228.22 -168.13 -220.80 -167.40
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at ﬁrm-level. Dependent variable is the dummy variable STAGING which takes
value one when staging takes place and 0 otherwise. Marginal eﬀects are indicated.
Table 8: The Use of the Diﬀerent Milestone Types with Pure Milestones and Mixes
Pure Milestones Mixes
Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. N Pr(|T| > |t|)
Product Milestone 0.208 0.409 53 0.342 0.478 73 0.0915
Financial Milestone 0.113 0.320 53 0.123 0.331 73 0.8637
Other Milestone 0.208 0.409 53 0.205 0.407 73 0.9777
Milestone Mix 0.472 0.504 53 0.329 0.473 73 0.1098
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the diﬀerent milestone types for the use
with pure milestone ﬁnancing and mixes respectively.
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35Table 10: The Determinants of a Speciﬁc Milestone Category (1)
The determinants of product milestones
Model 1 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age -0.025 -1.45
Early Stage 0.094 0.72
RAI -0.222 -2.33
AI -0.117 -2.75
Break Even -0.051 -0.29
Aud. Balance Sheet -0.090 -0.78
Finished Product -0.185 -1.47
Reference Customers -0.096 -0.76
Product Development 0.269 2.78
Patents -0.043 -0.49 0.066 0.54 0.046 0.39 0.039 0.32 -0.027 -0.29
Independent VC -0.009 -0.05 -0.160 -0.90 -0.097 -0.59 -0.090 -0.55 -0.025 -0.19
Public VC -0.239 -1.51 -0.323 -2.01 -0.292 -1.87 -0.288 -1.83 -0.209 -1.41
Period 1 0.224 1.06 0.380 1.74 0.321 1.55 0.294 1.35 0.129 0.71
Period 3 0.027 0.31 0.117 1.09 0.124 1.17 0.121 1.13 0.074 0.79
Growth Industries 0.039 0.31 0.033 0.27 0.024 0.20
Life Sciences 0.094 0.71 0.083 0.67
Internet -0.241 -2.02 -0.243 -1.97
IT/Telecom -0.161 -1.44 -0.127 -1.08
Trad. High-Tech -0.125 -1.14 -0.066 -0.56
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 20.40 17.54 15.68 16.92 24.90
Prob. 0.0257 0.0250 0.0283 0.0762 0.0055
R2 0.1346 0.1500 0.1387 0.1420 0.1776
Log Likelihood -61.078 -43.825 -45.430 -45.259 -56.688
The determinants of ﬁnancial milestones
Model 1 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age 0.009 1.91
Early Stage -0.116 -1.44
RAI 0.034 1.07
AI 0.042 2.23
Break Even 0.018 0.37
Aud. Balance Sheet 0.052 1.28
Finished Product -0.047 -1.12
Reference Customers 0.132 2.91
Product Development -0.061 -1.65
Patents 0.053 1.00 0.049 1.22 0.071 1.75 0.052 1.63 0.057 1.15
Independent VC -0.185 -1.72 -0.123 -1.42 -0.127 -1.31 0.111 -1.40 -0.165 -1.94
Public VC -0.013 -0.15 -0.009 -0.15 -0.007 -0.09 0.001 0.02 -0.014 -0.19
Period 1 0.304 1.93 0.149 1.26 0.119 1.23 0.159 1.83 0.292 1.81
Period 3 -0.002 -0.04 0.002 0.05 -0.024 -0.50 -0.017 -0.47 -0.005 -0.10
Growth Industries -0.053 -1.07 -0.047 -0.90 0.043 -1.01
Life Sciences -0.081 -1.14 -0.080 -1.12
Internet 0.075 0.67 0.023 0.25
IT/Telecom -0.030 -0.46 -0.067 -1.02
Trad. High-Tech -0.040 -0.57 -0.043 -0.59
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 22.90 8.34 16.29 24.61 22.04
Prob. 0.0111 0.4010 0.0226 0.0061 0.0149
R2 0.1843 0.1791 0.2350 0.2862 0.1610
Log Likelihood -33.574 -17.558 -20.210 -18.858 -32.277
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at ﬁrm-level. Dependent variable is the dummy vari-
able PRODUCT (FINANCIAL) MILESTONE which takes value one when a ﬁnancial (product) milestone
is used with milestone ﬁnancing and 0 otherwise. Marginal eﬀects are indicated.
36Table 11: The Determinants of a Speciﬁc Milestone Category (2)
The determinants of ”other” milestones
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age -0.009 -0.82
Early Stage 0.004 0.04
RAI 0.036 0.54
AI 0.004 0.12
Break Even 0.007 0.05
Aud. Balance Sheet -0.039 -0.33
Finished Product -0.001 -0.01
Reference Customers 0.043 0.42
Product Development -0.159 -1.94
Patents -0.100 -1.19 -0.175 -1.78 -0.179 -1.95 -0.179 -1.98 -0.085 -1.04
Independent VC 0.094 0.59 0.081 0.45 0.120 0.71 0.112 0.66 0.131 0.90
Public VC 0.118 0.59 0.236 1.02 0.280 1.21 0.261 1.13 0.135 0.67
Period 3 0.095 1.25 0.036 0.38 0.045 0.49 0.042 0.46 0.060 0.81
Growth Industries 0.053 0.52 0.048 0.47 0.041 0.41
Life Sciences -0.029 -0.22 -0.036 -0.27
Internet -0.046 -0.30 -0.044 -0.28
IT/Telecom 0.026 0.20 -0.002 -0.01
Trad. High-Tech -0.191 -1.56 -0.190 -1.63
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 8.13 6.50 6.78 7.00 11.86
Prob. 0.5207 0.4824 0.3412 0.6369 0.2212
R2 0.0812 0.0744 0.0762 0.0795 0.1115
Log Likelihood -57.625 -40.843 -41.488 -41.338 -53.500
The determinants of milestone mixes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age 0.009 0.68
Early Stage -0.014 -0.09
RAI 0.122 1.44
AI 0.048 1.15
Break Even -0.082 -0.47
Aud. Balance Sheet 0.073 0.57
Finished Product 0.202 1.36
Reference Customers -0.072 -0.51
Product Development -0.043 -0.40
Patents 0.082 0.77 0.074 0.83 0.041 0.35 0.065 0.55 0.065 0.61
Independent VC 0.114 0.63 0.253 1.41 0.114 0.60 0.123 0.66 0.115 0.71
Public VC 0.158 0.76 0.265 1.13 0.071 0.32 0.078 0.35 0.151 0.77
Period 1 -0.288 -1.15 -0.201 -0.85 -0.210 -0.89 -0.219 -1.00 -0.262 -1.08
Period 3 -0.053 -0.54 -0.117 -1.26 -0.081 -0.71 -0.087 -0.76 -0.095 -0.97
Growth Industries 0.002 0.09 0.018 0.12 0.051 0.37
Life Sciences 0.152 0.87 0.114 0.70
Internet 0.390 1.98 0.349 1.80
IT/Telecom 0.273 1.70 0.271 1.72
Trad. High-Tech 0.458 2.58 0.376 2.18
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 8.95 6.51 2.87 5.90 10.06
Prob. 0.5365 0.5900 0.8969 0.8236 0.4351
R2 0.0624 0.0537 0.0282 0.0514 0.0606
Log Likelihood -75.719 -49.996 -53.202 -51.933 -72.308
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at ﬁrm-level. Dependent variable is the dummy vari-
able OTHER MILESTONE (MILESTONE MIX) which takes value one when an other milestone (milestone
mix) is used with milestone ﬁnancing and 0 otherwise. Marginal eﬀects are indicated.
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.
39Table 14: The Determinants between Pure Milestones, Pure Rounds and Mixes (2)
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